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ARTICLES
THE POLITICS OF RISK: PRE-LITIGATION SITE
ASSESSMENT IN HOUSTON, TEXAS
BY
GREGG P. MACEY*
This Article provides a case study of agency decision-making
under uncertainty, specifically the administrative process used by a
state agency to mvestigate potential site contamination. Analysis of the
Railroad Commission of Texas' use of site and risk assessment in a
neighborhood built over crude oil storage tanks known as Kennedy
Heights demonstrates how purportedly scientific processes can fail to
embody the kinds of rational analytical approaches on which
regulatory agencies publicly claim they depend Primary documents
outlining the various efforts of the state agency, in coordination with a
regulated entity, suggest that these processes were shaped in different
ways, used divergent assumptions, and ultimately yielded findings that
more closely resembled arguments than results.
The rich history left behind by the story of Kennedy Heights gives
us a chance to see the tasks of site characterization and risk
assessment for what they are: inherently political exercises, riddled
with limitations, and bounded in terms of what they can tell the expert
or the layman. Given the changing standards of admissibility for
scientific evidence in mass torts cases influenced by the holding in
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Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., this understanding has
impleations for the regulatory and common law uses of data gathering
and analysis that extend far beyond the boundaries of one subdivision
in Houston, Texas. The nature of risk assessment in the context of
contaminated sites, where negotiation supplants analysis, should give
us pause before we accept the growing expectation of scientific validity
in the federal courts. Approaches to the admissibility of negotiated
evidence in a post-Daubert context, where district court judges apply
heightened tests of validity to expert-driven documents and testimony,
are considered
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I. INTRODUCTION
The residents of Kennedy Heights in southeast Houston, Texas wrestle
with a complex set of questions about their neighborhood. At base is their
concern that something dangerous, potentially even poisonous, exists beneath
the soil of their single family homes. To get answers, they called upon the
appropriate state and federal regulatory agencies in the early 1990s,
specifically the Railroad Commission of Texas and the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), to investigate what earlier contractors hired by the
city suspected was residual contamination from crude oil storage. The
investigations took ten years and encompassed two of four elements of the
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scientifically accepted practice of risk assessment: exposure assessment1 and
risk characterization.2 Residents of the subdivision also sought redress in the
courts, filing toxic tort claims against the former owners of the site.3 The two
processes, risk assessment by the state and EPA and toxic tort litigation, are
driven to varying degrees by questions of causation, which are answered by
the same type of people: "experts." Before residents can be told whether the
air they breathe or the water they drink is causing them harm or threatening
them, a series of "experts," mostly contractors hired by an agency or
potentially liable party, will first look at the totality of the evidence and make a
series of judgment calls.4
This Article will demonstrate how one final product of either process,
whether called a "site assessment" or "risk assessment," is merely a stylized
account of a negotiated process between regulated entities and agencies that
lack the wherewithal to participate in the give-and-take that is involved.
Simply put, the thesis is that the institutional setting in which risk assessments
are undertaken can subordinate intellectual form while elevating negotiation
and compromise. The results of this politicized investigation might be clearly
stated in a government document, but the assumptions underlying the findings
and the process that led to the collection of data points will be obscured or
left out.
Why does this finding matter for toxic tort litigation? It is important
because, despite the shortcomings inherent in a politicized process and
problems with communicating risk once it has been quantified by hired
experts, this approach to -risk assessment5 is accepted practice among
regulatory agencies. More generally, it comports with the received view of
science first sketched by Karl Popper. Popper noted that, far from universal
knowledge derived from formal logic, science is an imperfect process
involving intuition, conjecture, inference, professional judgment, and repeated
testing.6 This sort of "deductive falsification" guides most of the progress of
science today.
However, a relatively recent development in the courts offers a
competing view of science, one that is more closely aligned with the
1 "Exposure assessment is the process of measuring or estimating the intensity, frequency,
and duration of human exposures to an agent currently present in the environment .... ." COMM.
ON THE INSTITUTIONAL MEANS FOR ASSESSMENT OF RISKS TO PUB. HEALTH, NAT'L ACAD. OF ScI., RISK
ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: MANAGING THE PROCESS 20 (1983), available at
http://newton.nap.edu/books/0309033497/htmV20.html.
2 "Risk characterization is the process of estimating the incidence of a health effect under
the various conditions of human exposure described in exposure assessment. It is performed by
combining the exposure and does-response assessments." Id.
3 Order Consolidating Actions at 1, Adams v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., No. 96-1462
(S.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 1996).
4 See KRISTEN SHRADER-FRECHETTE, RISK AND RATIONALITY 53 (1991) (explaining the risk
assessment process at Yucca Mountain, Nevada).
5 Proposed Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 61 Fed. Reg. 17,960, 17,981 (Apr.
23, 1996).
6 See David Goodstein, How Science Works, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE 67, 70-71 (Fed. Judicial Ctr. ed., 2d ed. 2000) (explaining Karl Popper's falsification
theory).
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logician's search for universal knowledge derived from formal logic.7 The
ascendancy of this new standard of scientific validity in the courts presents
residents of contaminated communities and agency policymakers with a
conundrum: the methods upon which they must rely to demonstrate that
their properties pose a risk and should be cleaned up call for improvement
and greater transparency, while at the same time a new judicial
interpretation of scientific evidence threatens to discount the practice as a
whole. This Article argues that, given the nature of risk assessment in the
context of contaminated sites, where negotiation supplants analysis, the
courts' growing expectation of scientific validity is unrealistic at best.
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrill Dow
Phannaceuticls, Inc.,' federal trial judges are charged with the task of
determining the admissibility of scientific evidence, including the results of
site and risk assessments that are used in toxic tort cases. Because
causation claims in toxic tort cases rest on expert testimony, this
"gatekeeper" role for district judges is critical: if experts are not allowed to
speak to their findings, most toxic tort cases will be dismissed on summary
judgment. How are district judges supposed to evaluate evidence that
purports to be scientific? Daubert requires a trial court, under Rule 104(a) of
the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE),9 to determine whether an expert is
testifying from "scientific knowledge""° and whether their reasoning or the
methodology underlying their findings is "scientifically valid."11 In dictum,
the Court added several criteria for whether information testified to by an
expert witness could be considered valid, in addition to the test of "general
acceptance" formerly used in Frye v. United States.2 whether the
methodology employed to generate the information can be proven wrong,
whether the method has undergone publication or peer review, the existence
and maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operation, and the
method's known or potential rate of error.'3 Many courts have read these
requirements (and others suggested in subsequent decisions 14) to mean that
the evidence presented by a scientific expert should be without flaws,
logical leaps, or inferences that have not been proven fully. This high
standard of validity is evidenced in the "corpuscular approach" used by most
courts: a proponent of scientific evidence must establish the reliability and
7 See STEvE J. HEIS, JOHN VON NEUMANN & NORBERT WIENER: FROM MATHEMATICS TO THE
TECHNOLOGIES OF LIFE AND DEATH 136 (1980) (outlining Von Neumann's efforts to explain the
mysteries of life through formal mathematic structure).
8 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
9 FED. R. EvID. 104(a); Daubert 509 U.S. at 589-93.
10 Daube4 509 U.S. at 589-90.
11 Id at 592-93.
12 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
13 Daubert 509 U.S. at 593-94.
14 See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 147 (1997) (holding that a court may conclude
that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered);
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 159 (1999) (holding that a district court can base its
decision upon failure to satisfy either Dauberfs factors or any other set of reasonable reliability
criteria).
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relevance of every individual study from which he drew his findings (in
addition to the same test for the expert's broader conclusions).l5 Absent this
finding, the study (and testimony) will be excluded.'6
Challenges to expert testimony were more successful following the
Daubert decision. One report found that "the exclusion rate in the Third
Circuit for evidence based on physical science in a product liability case
jumped from 53% during the two years before Daubert to 70% between mid-
1995 and mid-1996."17 A fifty-case sample of civil actions spanning three
months found that district judges excluded 90% of the challenged experts.18
The post-Daubert environment, characterized by a conception of science
that is more exacting than the scientific method itself, posed a challenge to
the residents of Kennedy Heights, whose legal counsel decided to settle
rather than face a Daubert hearing on their soil and water contamination
evidence.'9 The changing judicial conception of the scientific process also
raises questions regarding how one should make sense of site
characterization and risk assessment, such as what took place at Kennedy
Heights for more than ten years.2" Do the results of site assessment in
15 See Thomas 0. McGarity, On the Prospect of "Daubertizing" Judicial Review of Risk
Assessmen; 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 155, 172 (2003).
16 An example of the use of the corpuscular approach is General Electric Co. v. Joiner, the
reasoning of which (along with Daubert) has been enshrined in a recent amendment of Rule 702
of the FRE. FED. R. EID. 702. In Joiner, the plaintiffs' experts concluded-and offered to
testify-that plaintiffs had developed lung cancer because of their exposure to polychlorinated
biphenyls (PCBs). Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 140. The experts offered five studies to
support this finding, one animal bioassay and four epidemiological studies. The Supreme Court
ruled that the trial judge was entitled to find that each of the studies lacked the necessary
validity for drawing a reliable scientific inference regarding PCBs and whether they caused
cancer. Id at 144-45. One of the studies lacked statistical significance (although the Court did
not provide a gauge of the p values necessary for declaring a significant finding, leaving that
determination for the authors of the study). Id. at 145. Another found a statistically significant
relationship between PCB exposure and lung cancer death, but because the Japanese factory
workers in that study had been exposed to other potentially carcinogenic substances (such as
rice oil), the study was invalid (again, there is no discussion of whether statistical measures for
accounting for confounding variables used in the study were adequate, or how one would
evaluate such a procedure). Id. at 146. Plaintiffs' experts were not allowed to testify as to their
findings. Id at 146-47.
17 LLOYD DIXON & BRIAN GILL, CHANGES IN THE STANDARDS FOR ADMITTING EXPERT EVIDENCE
IN FEDERAL CIVIL CASES SINCE THE DAUBERTDECISION, at xvi (2001).
18 See Jan Beyea & Daniel Berger, Scientific Misconceptions Among Daubert Gatekeepers:
The Need for Reform of Expert Review Procedures, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 327, 358-59
(2001).
19 See GREGG P. MACEY & LAWRENCE SUSSKIND, USING DISPUTE RESOLUTION TECHNIQUES TO
ADDRESS ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE CONCERNS: CASE STUDIES 36 (2003), available at
http://www.epa gov/compliance/resources/publications/ej/cbi-case-study-report.pdf (prepared
for the U.S. EPA Office of Environmental Justice) (discussing plaintiffs' concern that the judge
would make swift rulings on certain aspects of the case).
20 See Andrew Trask, Daubert and the EPA: An Evidentiary Approach to Reviewing Agency
Deterninations of Risk, 1997 U. CH1. LEGAL F. 569, 569 (advocating for "reducing [scientific]
uncertainty by applying the Daubert standard for admissibility of expert testimony to judicial
review of agency decisions"); E. Donald Elliott et al., Science, Agencies, and the Courts: Is
Three a Crowd 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,125, 10,129 (2001) (discussing the attractiveness of
applying a "'regulatory Daubed as a principle for judicial review of agency decisionmaking in
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Kennedy Heights, where "scientific" methods were applied in a form of
negotiation between a regulated entity (Chevron) and a resource-strapped
and arguably inept agency (the Railroad Commission), suggest that litigators
should call for a more stringent application of the Daubert doctrine? Or does
such an approach to admissibility render entire axeas of inquiry, such as risk
assessment, essentially off-limits to toxic tort plaintiffs? Is there another way
to view the process of site or risk assessment that would be more useful to
interested parties in a toxic tort litigation?
To explore these issues, this Article sets out the story of Kennedy
Heights. Rather than focus on the case that was ultimately settled by a court-
appointed special master, the Article delves into the administrative process
of investigating potential site contamination. The process is recounted here
following extensive document review, including internal and external
Railroad Commission correspondence, field notes, and data; site and risk
assessment documents prepared by all relevant parties; historical primary
documents regarding the site's history; and interviews with a handful of
"experts" charged with managing the process (from the Railroad
Commission, Exploration Technologies, Inc., the Texas Natural Resources
Conservation Commission, and Chevron attorneys, who spoke on behalf of
the contractors who prepared the site's only comprehensive risk assessment
report).
The resulting case study will help make sense of how site and risk
assessment fail to embody the kinds of rational analytical approaches upon
which regulatory agencies publicly claim they depend and that they hold up
to their constituents as scientific. Second, given the standards of admission
for scientific evidence in mass torts cases shaped by the holding in Daubert,
the Kennedy Heights experience should give us pause before we accept the
assumption, exhibited even by the final judge to preside over Adams v.
Chevron USA., Inc. (Adams v. Chevron),2 that such evidence must be
sufficiently established and constitute scientific proof of a certain
proposition.2 2 Primary documents outlining the various efforts toward site
characterization and risk assessment suggest that these processes were
shaped in different ways, used divergent assumptions, and ultimately yielded
findings that more closely resembled arguments than results. The rich
history left behind by the Kennedy Heights story gives us a chance to see the
tasks of site characterization and risk assessment for what they are:
inherently political exercises, riddled with limitations, and bounded in terms
of what they can tell the expert or the layman. Such an understanding has
implications for the regulatory and common law uses of data gathering and
analysis that extend far beyond the boundaries of one subdivision in
Houston, Texas.
the scientific realm... as a reform to enhance agency decisionmaking, to refine judicial review,
and to promote accountability").
21 Adams v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., No. 96-1462 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 19, 1998).
22 Transcript of Hearing Before the Honorable David Hittner at 17, Adams v. Chevron U.S.A.
Inc., No. 96-1462 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 19, 1998).
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II. THE SITE: KENNEDY HEIGHTS, TEXAS
A. Preliminary Note
This Article describes the site characterization and risk assessment
undertaken by administrative bodies in Kennedy Heights. There are three
primary rationales for conducting a single case study: when the case meets
all the conditions for and thus is a "critical case" for testing the propositions
of a well-formulated theory, when it "represents an extreme or unique case,"
and when it is a "revelatory case. "23
Occasionally, there will be a clearly specified theory with a set of
propositions that can be tested by a single case because the case meets each
of the conditions for testing the theory. Graham Allison's Essence of
Decision fits this description.24 The single case was the standoff between the
Soviet Union and the United States over the siting of intermediate-range
missiles in Cuba. Allison offered and compared three competing theories to
generate the best explanation for the type of crisis embodied in the
conflict.25 Similarly, Gross et al. focused on a single school in their work
Implementing Organizational Innovations.26 The conventional wisdom was
that innovations failed because of certain barriers to innovation, namely,
organizational members' initial resistance to change.27 Gross et al.
demonstrated that, in one school, flawed implementation processes rather
than barriers explained outcomes.2" The work was considered a defining
moment in innovation theory. 2
9
Another occasion for presenting a single case is when it represents an
extreme example.3" This is true when a phenomenon is so rare that social
scientists are unable to find common patterns, such as occurs in clinical
psychology when a rare syndrome is identified.31
23 ROBERT K. YIN, CASE STUDY RESEARCH: DESIGN AND METHODS 38-41 (2d ed. 1994).
24 GRAHAM T. ALLISON, ESSENCE OF DECISION: EXPLAINING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS (1971).
25 See id, at 245 (explaining that three conceptual models were used to explore the Cuban
Missile Crisis, whereby "[e]ach conceptual framework consists of a cluster of assumptions and
categories that influence what the analyst finds puzzling, how he formulates his question, where
he looks for evidence, and what he produces as an answer").
26 NEAL GROSS, JOSEPH B. GIACQUINTA & MARILYN BERNSTEIN, IMPLEMENTING ORGANIZATIONAL
INNOVATIONS: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF PLANNED EDUCATIONAL CHANGE (1971).
27 Id. at 1, 195-96.
28 See id at 200-01 (concluding that the school's failure to implement the innovation "was a
consequence of the director's restricted view of the process of the implementation of
organizational innovations and his lack of awareness of his role obligations to his subordinates
when he initiated this process").
29 See, e.g., Michael S. Knapp, Between Systemic Reforms and the Mathematics and Science
Classroom The Dynamics of innovation, Implementation, and Professional Learning 28 (Nat'l
Inst. for Science Educ., Research Monograph No. 1, 1997), available at http://www.wcer.wisc.
edu/archive/NISE/Publications/ResearchMonographs/KNAPP/KnappALL.pdf (citing
IMPLEMENTING ORGANIZATIONAL INNOVATIONS as one of three major works since the early 1960s
advancing innovation theory through case study research).
30 YIN, supra note 23, at 39-40.
31 See id at 39 (providing as an example some patients' inability to recognize familiar faces
if given only visual cues and the consequent difficulty for scientists of establishing common
2007]
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A final rationale concerns the revelatory case as single case.32 A
revelatory case is recommended when "an investigator has an opportunity to
observe and analyze a phenomenon previously inaccessible to scientific
investigation."3 Elliot Liebow's Tally's Cornerwas one of the first examples
of a social scientist gaining access to a circle of individuals living in an
impoverished neighborhood.34 By doing so, he demonstrated, through thick
descriptions of the problems of unemployment, how further research could
be carried out.35 The seminal example of a combination of the theory testing
and revelatory case study is The Chalenger Launch Decision by Diane
Vaughan.36 In 575 pages, Vaughan shows the inaccuracy of conventional
theories for why the Challenger was allowed to launch in January 1986.
Through meticulous historical reconstruction based on over 122,000 pages
of documents collected by a presidential commission and copies of original
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) documents stored
at a warehouse at the Johnson Space Center,37 Vaughan showed that
production pressures and managerial wrongdoing were not to blame. Rather,
NASA experienced an "incremental descent into poor judgment" where signs
of potential danger were normalized in engineering risk assessments.35
Vaughan noted: "The cause of disaster was a mistake embedded in the
banality of organizational fife .... As this book revises historically accepted
interpretations, it embraces broader themes. It describes how deviance in
organizations is transformed into acceptable behavior."31 The Challenger
Launch Decision has encouraged an entire subdiscipline in historical
sociology of disaster studies.
40
The following case study represents an attempt to capture the first two
rationales for a single case study because it is both a critical and a unique
case: By reconstructing a ten-year negotiated process that led to the results
of site and risk assessment, the author seeks to offer a competing
interpretation of these assessment methods. The following case study can be
held up against standard accounts of risk assessment that portray a rational,
scientific exercise. It can also provide avenues for future scholarship and
broader case comparison on how resource-limited regulatory agencies carry
out decision making in the presence of uncertainty.
At the same time, the Kennedy Heights story is revelatory on two levels.
First, no one has told this particular story before, except when the EPA
patterns in the syndrome due to its rarity).
32 Id. at 40.
3 Id
34 ELLIOT LIEBOW, TALLY'S CORNER: A STUDY OF NEGRO STREETCORNER MEN (1967).
35 Id at 3-10 (discussing the need to expand the focus of poverty research beyond poor
women and children).
36 DIANE VAUGHAN, THE CHALLENGER LAUNCH DECISION: RISKY TECHNOLOGY, CULTURE, AND
DEVIANCE AT NASA (1996).
37 Id at 459-60.
38 Id at xiii.
39 Id at xiv.
40 See, e.g., Kathleen J. Tierney, Toward a Cr1tical Sociology of Risk, 14 Soc. F. 215, 224, 229
(1999) (discussing the impacts of Vaughan's research on the field of risk analysis).
[Vol. 37:15
THE POLITICS OF RISK
asked the author to discuss the settlement process. Second, the
phenomenon of an inept agency negotiating the findings of a contaminated
site investigation has in large part proven inaccessible to legal scholars and
social scientists. The author discovered the primary sources for this case
study through a series of fortuitous events. While researching the settlement
process that ended toxic tort litigation in this case, a prominent law firm in
the case invited the author to travel to a nearby warehouse where the
entirety of its discovery and trial preparation materials had been catalogued
and stored. The author spent the better part of one week at the warehouse
and generated copies of the pleadings, expert reports, correspondence,
exhibits, depositions, and historical documents. These were supplemented
with more recent public records requests to the Railroad Commission and
EPA, which shared jurisdiction over the site. The length of the following
case study is intended to offer sufficient evidence for the negotiated process
that the author discovered, and also to enable other researchers to consider
new and heretofore unarticulated explanations for why, after ten years and
millions of dollars spent on everything but site cleanup, the residents of
Kennedy Heights were asked to accept the status quo and move on with
their lives. This Article offers only a detailed reconstruction of an agency-
industry negotiation, for which the former was woefully unprepared. The
reasons why the process proved asymmetric, or why the residents were and
continue to feel short-changed, are too many and varied to be sifted through
and settled in one case. Still, the story is one worth telling, and in some
detail. In addition to its alternative interpretation of a scientific process and
its foundation in materials that are not normally available to legal scholars, it
represents an effort to bring what happened in Kennedy Heights to a broader
audience of attorneys and legal scholars. The residents with whom the
author spoke at the subdivision wanted to share their experiences with this
audience, and extra efforts to preserve the chain of events as they occurred
will be evident to the reader.
The narrative begins with a history of the site, including its
transformation from crude oil storage pits to single family residential
properties. The racial underpinnings of decisions to develop the property in
certain ways suggest one explanation for why the residents of this
subdivision, who are predominately black, approached this process with
such mistrust. Whether the racial makeup of the neighborhood contributed
to the lack of action by the City of Houston for twenty years after problems
began to arise is a question that cannot be answered with the materials that
the author encountered. The next sections describe the discovery of the
presence of crude oil under the property and reconstruct the assessment
process. The account of site investigations will show how resource
constraints and the kinds of pragmatic considerations that they require can
subsume objective analysis in the practice of site and risk assessment. The
discussion section explores implications for assessment-as-negotiation,
particularly as they relate to the climate for toxic tort litigation that arose
following the Daubert decision.
20071
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B. History: The Racial Underpinnings of Site Redevelopment
The Pierce Junction oil well yielded a quarter of a million barrels of oil
every two months during the 1920s.41 Discovered in 1921, the well was
connected by pipeline to a series of pits, including three unlined earthen
storage tanks southeast of Houston, known as the Mykawa Tank Farm.
4 2
Each with the capacity to hold 300,000 barrels of crude oil, the pits were
located to the south of Selinsky Road and to the east of what is now Cullen
Boulevard (then Chocolate Bayou Road) in the Kennedy Heights
subdivision.43 The northeast and northwest pits were operational and
covered with lumber roofing while the southeast pit was filled with brine.'
The storage pits were partially destroyed by a hurricane that broke apart the
wooden roofs covering the pits in 1927.11 Because of the damage, as well as
marginal production at the Pierce Junction field, owner Gulf Production
Company (Gulf Oil) ceased operations at the tank farm.46
While actual use of the property after the pits were abandoned is
uncertain, it is clear that the site accommodated other land uses over the
course of the next four decades.4 7 The pits remained visible in aerial
photographs taken in 1935, 1945, 1955, and 1969.48 During much of this time,
Gulf Oil failed to "secure the site from the public and, as a consecjuence,
municipal waste, junk, debris, rubbish and hazardous substances were
deposited at the site."49 In the mid-1960s, Gulf had the site appraised and
41 Pierce Junction WeLi Fows 250,000 Barrels m Two Months Period, Hous. CHRON., Sept. 2,
1921.
42 Deposition upon Written Questions of James F. Stephenson at 2-3, Simmons v. Chevron
U.S.A., Inc., No. 95-14770 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 10, 1996).
43 Id; Statement of Nov. 30, 1924, Received Dec. 15, 1924 by the Texas Railroad Commission
(on file with author) (showing amount of tankage capacity location and quantity of crude
petroleum owned by the pipe line, the amount held in storage for others, and unfilled storage at
close of business).
44 Deposition upon Written Questions of James F. Stephenson at 3, Simmons. v. Chevron
U.S.A., Inc., No. 95-14770 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 10, 1996).
45 Id.
46 See ECOLOGY& ENV'T, INC., EXPANDED SITE INSPECTION: FINAL REPORT 2-2 (2001) (prepared
for U.S. EPA Region 6) (on file with author) (reporting that, "[aiccording to aerial photographic
analysis, the property was not used for oil and gas activities after 1930, the earliest date for
which aerial photographs are available.").
47 For example, some documents suggested that Gulf Oil leased the property to local dairy
farmers and cattlemen. A review of aerial photographs from 1930 to the 1960s revealed evidence
of cows in a field southeast of the northwest pit in 1955.
48 Memorandum from David Krentz, Envti. Health, Health & Human Servs., City of Houston,
to Anthony Crisci, Capital Projects, City of Houston (Oct. 30, 1991) (on file with author)
(regarding Kennedy Heights water line replacement).
49 Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint at 4-5, Adams v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., No. 96-1462
(S.D. Tex. Oct. 1, 1996). In a letter to a city official, the contractor who first encountered signs
of crude oil contamination also noticed items that appeared to have been dumped in the area of
the former pits ("(6/3/91) Hit foreign debris at 5002 Fairgreen"; "(8/05/91) Hit car rim 11326
Murrway, underground"; "(12/03/91) Murrway Station # 32+55 (car door)"; "(12/3/91) Murrway
Station # 32+20 (tire)"). Letter from C.W. Paskey, Constr. Coordinator, Pas-Key Constr. Sews.,
Inc., to Richard Scott, Deputy. Dir., Capital Projects Dep't, City of Houston (Aug. 27, 1992) (on
file with author).
THE POLITICS OF RISK
began to take steps to dispose of the property. The appraisal documents
refer to the land near the tank farm, located near Chocolate Bayou, as a
"typical Negro area."
5°
Should this land be developed for low to medium priced housing with F. H. A.
or V. A. financing, it would have to be a bi-racial development according to the
present... regulations. It is felt that eventually this would be the highest and
best use of this property because it would then serve as a buffer between the
white residential area in Crestmont Park and the heavily colored developments
to the north and west.51
We feel by being surrounded by negro subdivisions this property is committed
to a use, either for subdivision purposes or other, by this element. Eventual
industrial use may be foreseeable; although, this seems unlikely with the
nearest trackage available two miles away.52
References to the social demographics of the area are indeed striking. Yet
they mask a more important distinction made in appraisal documents for the
tank farm. Prior to sale of the property, developers calculated the
appropriate cost of the land purchased with the storage tanks filled, after
their contents ("sludge," or the remnants of stored crude oil) were
removed 54 and the property sold to white residents.55
50 Letter from Earl A. Wyatt, Earl A. Wyatt and Assocs., to M.L. Hanna, Gulf Oil (Aug. 15,
1966) (on file with author).
51 Id.
52 Letter from R.E. Clemons, The Clemons Co., to J.L. Irvin, Vice President, Gulf Refining
Co. (Jan. 5, 1961) (on file with author).
. 53 The bottoms of crude oil storage tanks contain a mixture of crude oil, water, and other
substances that is commonly referred to as basic sediment and water, or BS&W.
54 Earl A. Wyatt, Appraisal of 131.61 Acres of Land, John White Survey, A. 1011, Harris
County, Texas, for M.L. Hanna, Gulf Oil (Feb. 10, 1964) (on file with author). The appraisal
describes the value of the site as follows:
The present worth of subject property is its market value less the cost of draining, filling
and leveling the three large open tanks.
Mr. R. Salmon, a dirt moving contractor, estimates it will take 3 months or longer to do
this work, at a cost of $2500 per tank. Mr. Neville of Humble figures his cost at $1500 per
acre of tank on some tanks in Humble that have as much as 6' of B.S. & W. These tanks
are approximately 400 feet square, and it is felt that $5000 per tank is a safer estimate of
cost, as it is not known how much experience Mr. Salmon has actually had in this type
[of] work. Like Mr. Neville, Mr. Salmon would spread out the sludge on the land to dry.
It is felt that land east of Chocolate Bayou Road will not sell as high as land adjoining a
present residential development, especially where this land will have to be developed as
a buffer zone between colored and white areas.
For the above reason it is felt that the price being asked for the 29 acres fairly well
represents the price at which a residential developer would buy subject property, if it
were in its original condition and free and clear of tanks.
Id
55 In describing the "[hlighest and [b]est [ulse" of the land, the appraisal prepared for Gulf
Oil says, "The most profitable use for this land appears to be for medium priced houses for
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For six years, Gulf Oil "unsuccessfully attempted to dispose of this
acreage."' The company then negotiated with John Lester, the president of
Log Development Company, who was interested in "acquiring the site for a
Negro residential and commercial development."57 In 1968, Gulf Oil
conveyed the site to Log Development.58 The transaction involved a tax-free
exchange of the Pierce Junction Tank Farm (valued at $274,107) for the
northwest corner of Richmond and Montrose Streets, in Houston. 59 Log
Development did not remove any tank bottoms in the area of the earthen
tanks utilized by Gulf Oil.'a Lester simply had the berms along the sides of
the pits pushed inward, filling the pits. The Kennedy Heights subdivision
physically replaced the Mykawa Tank Farm in the late 1960s.
C Residents Discover the Problem
The name of the subdivision, its location, the way it was marketed, and
documents obtained from Log Development suggest that, in the end, the
homes built over the tank farm were targeted at below-middle-income
African-American buyers. The subdivision quickly filled with new
homeowners. However, several aspects of the subdivision seemed "off" to
the new residents. Sidewalks and backyards would buckle and sink.
Residents noticed putrid smells and strange colorations in their tap and
bathwater. Some even experienced diseases that were not in their family
histories, including multiple forms of cancer and lupus. One resident had to
cope with four different forms of cancer nearly simultaneously.
Well, what I remember though, when I was a kid, we used to... [catch]
crawfish in the ditch behind the house, and I remember the soil had like four or
five different levels. It was like orange, purple, blue, and I guess reddish, plus
the dirt on top. But as a kid, I didn't know what it was ....
white occupancy, with a 200' wide commercial strip fronting on Chocolate Bayou Road as a
buffer strip against the all colored Cloverland Subdivision on the west side of Chocolate Bayou
Road." Id.; see also Letter from Earl A. Wyatt, Earl A- Wyatt & Assocs., to M.L. Hanna, Gulf Oil
(Feb. 17, 1964) (on file with author) (describing the area as "both colored and white, with
Chocolate Bayou Road serving as the dividing line" and noting, "[b]ecause of colored
settlements across the road to the west the highest and best use for this land appears for low
cost homes for white occupancy." Regarding necessary costs, "[tihe three large open earthen
pits on the land will have to be filled before subdivision work can proceed on all the land. This
may cost from $2500 to as much as $5000 per tank.").
56 Memorandum from P.J. Maddison to R.B. Gillies (Nov. 14, 1967) (on file with author)
(regarding the exchange of Pierce Junction Earthen Tank Farm, Chocolate Bayou Road,
Houston, Texas).
57 Id.
58 State of Texas, County of Harris, Conveyance of Property from Gulf Oil Corporation to
Log Development Company (Jan. 29, 1968) (on file with author).
59 Memorandum from P.J. Maddison, supra note 56.
60 Affidavit of John R. Lester, Adams v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., No. 96-1462 (S.D. Tex. July 6,
1997).
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... [T]he water has always been bad. We tried putting water filters,
everything on the water. And really I wish I would have kept the filters.
Because the filters that we would take out, it [sic] was filled with oil and green
gook and everything else. So finally it got so bad to where we were afraid to
drink the water even with filters. We changed filters 2-3 times a month and it
still was bad, so we had to start buying water to drink. And we've always had
dogs in the backyard. And every dog we've had, anytime they would dig, they
would die. At first we thought somebody was poisoning them. But after we
looked at it, anytime they would dig deep in the yard, they would die.... So
every dog we had in the back, that's what happened to them. And we had a pear
tree in the back and it was like one side of it would bear pears and one side
wouldn't. So the side that didn't bear pears, that's where the dogs would dig all
of the time and evidently there was something there.
61
... [Tihere's too many deaths for the amount of people. And that's what got
somebody's attention. That too many people were getting sick and dying. And
there were too many abnormalities and birth defects in people. I mean, you
know, even whole households, everybody was sick. You know, not just one.62
... [Like on my side, it was like every other house, somebody had died of
cancer. You don't tell me that's normal. That's not normal. [The special master]
was trying to tell us that that was normal in a neighborhood. It's not. This was
just on one side, within a block. I'm not talking about the other side,'or down
the street. Just one side. You're talking about 12 houses and every other house,
somebody has died with cancer.63
An additional concern focused on the water lines under subdivision
properties that would often rupture. One resident, a school teacher,
recorded the water main breaks on the inside cover of her husband's Bible.6C
61 Interview with Kennedy Heights Residents, in Houston, Tex. (Apr. 20, 2002) (on file with
author).
62 Interview with Helen Hinson & Joanne Jones, Residents of Kennedy Heights, in Houston,
Tex. (Apr. 15, 2002) (on file with author).
63 Interview with Kennedy Heights Residents, suprm note 61.
64 Some of the entries included the following:
Lord help us. We are your children. God[,] seems like the water is making Albert sick[.]
Lord help him.
September 12, 1971 The water has broken again. Lord[,] what can we do.
October 4, 1971 Water break[.]
October 22, 1971 Water break[.] The water smells real bad today. It['s] yellow looking.
Lord[,] what are we going to do.
April 26, 1972 The pipes are rusty[.] [Tihe workers said let the water run a long time[.]
July 1973 The water has broken again. Albert is sick[.] Lord[,] it[']s in your hands[.] Lord
I have called the city[.] [T]hey won't fix the water.
April 1975 Water breaks[.]
June 1975 Water breaks[.]
December 1975 Water break[.]
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Residents registered complaints about the water main breaks for twenty
years, yet Houston's Capital Projects Department did not begin major work
on pipe excavation and replacement until the early 1990s.65 The city sent a
contractor, Pas-Key Construction Services, to excavate a site on Murr Way
and replace some of the waterlines. 66 On September 18, 1991, the contractor
shut down the site over concerns about soil contamination, having
encountered "potentially contaminated toxic materials."6 7 Other employees
remarked that there was a creosote odor in the area and complained of eye
irritation.' The workers left a sizable hole in the ground and "ceased all
construction operations until further notice from the City of Houston Health
Department."69 Residents began to wonder why the work had ceased.
Perhaps the pipe replacements were part of a broader effort to increase the
number of units available within the subdivision, as word spread that a low-
income housing development was in the planning stages for the area.70
May 1976 Water breaks.
November 12, 1976 Water breaks[.]
January 1, 1977 New Year['Is day the water breaks[.] I can't cook.
January 20, 1977 Water breaks again. Pipes are rusty[;] they look bad[.]
May 10, 1977 Water break[.]
May 8,1978 City put in a blue plastic pipe[.] [H]ope it will hold[.]
This is May 3, 1981. The blue pipe busted[.] Oh God[,] the blue pipes are busting[.]
Feb. 4, 1982 Pipe burst[.]
June 19,1983 Pipe burst[.] I can't cook[.] Lord what[']s next[.]
Valorie Lusk, Notes in Family Bible (on file with author).
65 Even after litigation began, City of Houston utility complaint notices from July 14, 1995,
to September 29, 1996, reveal a total of 108 utility complaints made by Kennedy Heights
residents. City of Houston, Utility Complaint Notices (on file with author). Residents continue
to complain of water main breaks.
66 PAS-KEY CONSTRUCTION SERVICE, INC., REPORT ON WATER PROJECT No. 10086 (1992) (on file
with author).
67 Id.
68 Memorandum from John E. Arradondo, Dir., Health & Human Servs., City of Houston, to
Howard N. Nicholas, Dir., Capital Projects Dep't, City of Houston (Oct. 15, 1991) (on file with
author).
69 Letter from R.L. Paskey, President, Paskey Constr. Serv., Inc., to Howard Nicholas, Dir. of
Capital Projects Dep't, Dep't of Pub. Works, City of Houston, and Anthony Crisci, Manager of
Civil Constr. Section, Design & Constr. Div., Dep't of Pub. Works, City of Houston (Sept. 26,
1991) (on file with author). The Director of Health and Human Services for the City of Houston
recommended that "excavations in the Kennedy Heights subdivision be temporarily halted."
Memorandum from John E. Arradondo, supra note 68.
70 Construction on a new section of the Kennedy Heights subdivision began in 1994. New
Homes, Mortgage Assistance Offered, Hous. CHRON., Jan. 6, 1994, at A20. The developers
engaged in one of the first environmental reviews of the area, which included soil and
groundwater tests of the vacant property by Law Environmental, Inc. Law Environmental, Inc.,
Proposal for Phase I Additional Research and Limited Phase H-Field Sampling and Laboratory
Testing Program, Kennedy Heights Subdivision, Houston, Texas, Law Environmental Proposal
No. 714045, at 3-4 (Feb. 18, 1994) (on file with author).
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III. AGENCY SITE AND RISK ASSESSMENT: TEN YEARS AND FEW ANSWERS
Unbeknownst to residents, the City of Houston hired a contractor to
investigate petroleum contamination at Kennedy Heights.71 Thus began a
disjointed process convened by regulators and private industry, lasting more
than ten years, to assess whether Kennedy Heights residents were exposed
to dangerous levels of a variety of toxicants, including polycycic aromatic
hydrocarbons (PAHs), some of which are known carcinogens. 72 Some of the
data gathered were used years later by residents' legal counsel to piece
together a narrative for use in litigation against Chevron, which acquired the
property from Gulf Oil prior to its conversion to residential property.7" The
residents' narrative proceeded as follows: Breaks in water pipes under
Kennedy Heights, which were located in areas where the highest levels of
contaminants were found, caused periods of depressurization that allowed
the contaminants to enter the pipes.74 During this time, Kennedy Heights
experienced twenty to thirty water main breaks per mile per year.7 The
contaminants included several known animal carcinogens, including a
number of aromatic hydrocarbon compounds.7 6 One of the areas of the body
affected by exposure to PAHs is the immune system.7 7 Lupus, a disease in
which the immune system loses its ability to tell the difference between
71 LOCKWOOD, ANDREWS & NEWMAN, INC., POTENTIALLY PETROLEUM CONTAMINATED MATERIALS
INVESTIGATION: KENNEDY HEIGHTS SUBDIVISION 2 (1991) (prepared for the City of Houston) (on
file with author).
72 The Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry explains that
The Department of Health and Human Services has determined that some PAHs may
reasonably be expected to be carcinogens. Some people who have breathed or touched
mixtures of PAHs and other chemicals for long periods of time have developed cancer.
Some PAHs have caused cancer in laboratory animals when they breathed air containing
them (lung cancer), ingested them in food (stomach cancer), or had them applied to
their skin (skin cancer).
Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, ToxFAQs for Polycyclic Aromatic
Hydrocarbons, http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/tfacts69.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2007).
73 The resulting mass torts suit was filed against a series of named defendants, including
Chevron and Gulf Oil companies and subsidiaries, developers, construction companies,
investors, and investment trusts. Plaintiffs' Summary of the Case at 1, 20-21, Adams v. Chevron
U.S.A., Inc., No. 96-1462 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 10, 1997).
74 Id at 5.
75 Consultants for the plaintiffs found that "[c]rude oil constituents from tank bottoms
entering the drinking water system are distributed to homes in a short period of time." JACK V.
MATSON, EXPERT REPORT: ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS AT KENNEDY HEIGHTS SUBDIVISION,
HOUSTON, TEXAS 18 (1996) (prepared for O'Quinn, Kerensky, MacAninch & Laminack) (on file
with author). The primary mechanism for the transport of hydrocarbons was "entry from
suspension in water surrounding a main break." Id Dr. Jack Matson found that methane had
evolved from the conversion of tank bottom hydrocarbons and represented "an explosive threat
to residents: within the Pit Number One area [Northeast Pit]." Id. at 3.
76 Richard Clapp, with Boston University, reviewed a report by Meta Environmental, Inc.
and the results of testing done in Kennedy Heights in September 1996, and found several
substances that are animal carcinogens "and therefore may be expected to cause cancer and
other toxic effects in exposed humans." RICHARD CLAPP, REPORT OF RICHARD W. CLAPP 2 (1996)
(on file with author).
77 Id.
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foreign substances and its own cells and tissues, was prevalent in Kennedy
Heights at a rate several times the national prevalence rate.78 Other diseases
linked to some of the known or suspected carcinogens in the soil were also
prevalent in the subdivision.
79
Despite years of agency sampling and assessment and a trial that
advanced through thirty-one days of testimony (ending in a special master-
driven settlement), no work was carried out to replace the pipes under their
subdivision or remove any remnants of the Mykawa Tank Farm. EPA offered
the final official word on the subject of contamination at Kennedy Heights.
In response to continued resident complaints, the agency performed an
Expanded Site Inspection in August 1998 and concluded its work in 2001,
finding the site did not meet criteria for listing on the National Priorities
List.80
It is no surprise that the level of uncertainty over even the existence of
contamination remained high throughout much of the ten year process,
given the range of estimates derived from the various efforts of the parties.
Yet these highly technical procedures, coordinated by state and federal
agencies in cooperation with Chevron, consumed most of the resources
devoted to investigating residents' claims.
A. The Early Focus on Mutr Way
Site characterization began in September 1991 when the City of
Houston hired a contractor (Lockwood, Andrews, and Newnam, Inc. [LAN])
to investigate petroleum contamination in the subdivision.8 1 This occurred
after city personnel sent to the site noted a "creosote like odor in the air"
and found trihalomethanes (a volatile organic compound) and evidence of
trichloroethylene.82 Soil borings drawn along the water main replacement
route at zero to ten feet found contamination at a depth of two to seven feet,
including petroleum hydrocarbons "not normally indigenous to surface
78 Clapp calculated prevalence rates for systemic lupus erythematosus (SLE) and compared
his results with estimates of prevalence in whites and African-Americans in the United States.
National prevalence rates ranged from about 10 to 50 cases per 100,000. His estimate of the
combined population of both current and former residents of Kennedy Heights was 2,435, of
which 10 cases of SLE were reported. The prevalence of SLE in the combined population was
estimated at 411 per 100,000, or between 4.9 and 8.2 times the upper end of the range of
prevalence of SLE in the United States population. Clapp concluded that since the lower end of
the confidence interval for his estimate was still more than three times higher than the upper
range for the United States population, the results were not likely to be due to chance
fluctuation. Id at 3-4.
79 Judge Delays Water Project Until Safeguards Installed, HOUS. CHRON., Apr. 12, 1995, at
A21.
80 ECOLOGY & ENV'T, INC., supra note 46, at 5-2 (2001).
81 See LOCKWOOD, ANDREWS & NEWMAN, INC., supra note 71, at 2 (recounting the emergency
request from the City of Houston to determine the extent of soil contamination in the Kennedy
Heights subdivision).
82 CITY OF HOUSTON, REPORT OF LABORATORY INVESTIGATION OF SAMPLES COLLECTED FROM
MURR WAY LOCATIONS 1 (1991) (on file with author).
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soils."' While the city's analysis of samples taken from two water mains
near Murr Way (where Pas-Key work had ceased) suggested "no
contamination of the potable water supply system," LAN found
concentrations of total petroleum hydrocarbons (TPH) above levels
recommended by the Texas Water Commission (TWC) for soil
contamination.r' The city's Interim Director of Health and Human Services
also argued water line replacement should continue, to allow for "higher
water pressure" that would "decrease the probability of ground water
infiltration."8 5
The full results of the city's testing efforts were not shared with
residents or the contractor. 6 The TWC, Texas Railroad Commission (RRC),
and regional office of the Environmental Protection Agency, on the other
hand, were contacted..A TWC official arrived to conduct a site inspection,
but because the excavated site was already filled in, he was not able to take
samples (according to what are now Texas Natural Resource Conservation
Commission (TNRCC) guidelines).,7 Residents, who began to meet as the
Kennedy Heights Civic Association, formed a Contamination Committee and
collected money to pay for their own environmental consultant." Pas-Key
also hired a consultant to investigate the site. 9 By January 1992, contractors
hired by Pas-Key found "the contaminant is creosote mixed with crude oil
which will cause skin rash, dermatitis and sometimes breathing
difficulties."90 The city's sampling activity affected four streets, although
until this point contractors focused predominantly on the excavation area.91
A contractor hired by the residents found even higher levels of polyaromated
83 Memorandum from John E. Arradondo, supra note 68. City officials did not know "exactly
what the man-made pits were used for" at this point, although they had obtained aerial
photographs indicating the three large pits, each four acres in size. Id
84 LOCKWOOD, ANDREWS & NEWMAN, INC., supra note 71, at 6. Concentrations of TPH that
were above action levels for soil contamination set by TWC were found in soil samples from
five of the twenty-one soil borings.
85 Memorandum from M. des Vignes-Kendrick, Interim Dir., Health & Human Servs., City of
Houston, to Dir. of Capital Projects, City of Houston (Feb. 6, 1992) (on file with author).
86 In a summary of Water Project 10086, Pas-Key states that "[blecause the City had not
transmitted to Pas-Key the promised test results, on January 22, 1992 Pas-Key submitted various
soil samples to Dr. Edwin B. Smith, a consultant retained and paid by Pas-Key." PAS-KEY
CONSTRUCTION SERVICE, INC., supra note 66, at 2.
87 A TNRCC official familiar with the Kennedy Heights investigation stated:
We received the complaint in 1991 and went out and took a look to figure out what was
going on. Yeah, when the investigator actually got to the site, the excavation would have
been for the placement of the water line and they had already filled that in when the
investigator went out there. [If it had not been filled), [ilt's possible that there could have
been a sample taken.
Telephone Interview with Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm'n Official (May 28, 2002) (on
file with author).
88 Interview with Kennedy Heights Residents, supra note 61.
89 Letter from Edwin B. Smith, EFEH & Assocs., to Robert Paskey, Owner, Pas-Key Constr.
Serv., Inc. (Jan. 29, 1992) (on file with author).
90 Id.
91 Letter from Philip D. Barnard, Assistant Dir., Capital Projects Dep't, City of Houston, to
Robert Paskey, President, Pas-Key Constr. Servs., Inc. (Mar. 20, 1992) (on file with author).
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hydrocarbons in the soil.9 2 At around the same time, TWC changed its policy
for analyzing hydrocarbons, eliminating one method for analyzing total
petroleum hydrocarbon in water, land, and waste.
3
The pace of activity picked up in 1994 and 1995, when American Home
Dream Corporation requested an investigation of contamination at the site
of a proposed additional fifty-three units within Kennedy Heights. 4 The
contractor, RRC, and Chevron met to discuss the results, starting a trend
where environmental scientists, regulators, and the regulated met regarding
the site, at times without the input of the affected community.95 Meanwhile,
John Simmons, President of the Kennedy Heights Civic Association, started
an investigation of his own, finding enormously high rates of cancer and
lupus through an informal survey of the subdivision's 325 homes.
6
B. Chevron-Railroad Commission Joint Efforts
RRC, holding jurisdiction over petroleum spills and deposits in Texas,
investigated the Kennedy Heights neighborhood in 1994, reviewing results of
the city health department's earlier tests for contamination and above-
ground visual survey.97 Based on the city's data, RRC concluded that there
was no basis for the initiation of cleanup activities.98
To encourage regulatory action, residents began a letter writing
campaign in August 1995, sending letters to TNRCC and RRC urging them to
investigate the contamination under their homes.9 An attorney representing
92 John Hanby, the consultant hired by the Civic Association, found "'extremely high' levels
of petroleum-related chemicals" in the soil, with concentrations "several times higher. than the
city's highest reading." Bill Dawson & James Robinson, Housing Project Site May Be
Contaminated, Hous. CHRON., Feb. 15, 1994, at Al.
93 Memorandum from Sheila Meyers & Anne Rhyne, Quality Assurance Specialists, Field
Operations Div., Tex. Water Comm'n, to All Laboratory Personnel, Tex. Water Comm'n (Sept. 3,
1992) (on file with author).
The purpose of this letter is to inform the laboratories that the TWC will only accept
method 418.1 from "Methods for Chemical Analysis of Water and Wastes"... as an
acceptable method for analysis of Total Petroleum Hydrocarbon (TPH) of water, soil and
wastes .... [A] decision has been made to withdraw ASTM method 3328-78-B as an
acceptable method ....
Id
94 Law Environmental, Inc., supra note 70, at 1.
95 Id
96 Charles Zewe, Houston Residents Sue Chevron over Health Problems, CABLE NEWS
NETWORK, May 26, 1997, http://www.cnn.con/US/9705/26/toxic.controversy/ (last visited Dec.
26, 2006) (citing a survey taken by Simmons that showed that there were 113 cases of cancer,
brain tumors, lupus, and birth defects in the subdivision's 325 homes).
97 George Flynn & Bill Dawson, Relocation of Residents Proposed: Kennedy Heights Area
Contaminated, Hous. CHRON., Aug. 8,1995, at Al.
98 Id.
99 Over 200 letters were received by RRC, mostly in September 1995. Most of the letters
followed a similar format. Some included entirely unique portions, such as a letter sent by Anita
Smith, a resident of Kennedy Heights:
[Vol. 37:15
THE POLITICS OF RISK
John Simmons and other families (approximately 2,000 individuals at the
time) also presented a letter to the Chairman of RRC containing sixty-eight
pages of signatures and citing findings of explosive levels of methane gas
under certain homes."° RRC involvement began in earnest on August 23,
1995, when commission and Chevron representatives met to discuss the
site.' As much of the residents' emphasis (which led to a motion for
temporary injunction against the new contractor) focused on the threat of
explosive levels of methane, Chevron proposed installing several gas
monitoring wells in areas where high levels of subsurface methane had been
identified."°2 According to Chevron, testing would "assist in identifying the
source of the gas" and inform the applicability of surveying homes in the
subdivision for gas concentrations. 03
Chevron presented its Methane Investigation Proposal to RRC in
September 1995. The proposal called for three gas monitoring wells using
push tools in areas of "highest reported gas concentrations" (as found by
residents' contractors") to take samples at two-foot intervals (vertical).'015
The sample with the highest TPH reading for each well underwent additional
testing for PAHs, metals, volatiles, semi-volatiles, and hazardous
characteristics.0 6 In addition, twelve to fifteen soil borings were taken to a
depth of four feet to test for lower explosive limits of methane, CO 2, and
02.107 This was the first of several attempts by Chevron to measure the
extent of contamination in Kennedy Heights. Local residents contested the
series of assumptions on which the measurements were based. Table 1
provides the primary concerns raised by residents during testing at the
subdivision.
We the Resident[s] in the Kennedy Heights subdivision area... have relative's [sic] that
have die[d]. And we still have family, neighbors who are still dieing [sic] and we have
children who are having, liver, kenney [sic], tum[o]rs, and heart prombles [sic] and their
[sic] are more than just that of prombles [sic] that a lot's [sic] of resident and their family
are having. And we have some children who will not grow.... I also have 4 yr's [sic] old
who is in liver fluer [sic]. Every [sic] sens [sic] he was bron [sic] he have had the liver
promble[m] he bron [sic] with a pi[e]ce of his liver missing. Pleas[e] [w]e need your help
bad[;] get us out of here. [T]he pepold's [sic] of Kennedy Heights need help now.
Letter from Anita Smith, Resident of Kennedy Heights, to Bill Hall, R.R. Comm'n of Tex.
(received Sept. 14, 1995).
100 E-mail from Bill R. Hall to NIELSONJ, BIARDB, MITCHELL & DEESJ (Aug. 10, 1995,
10:19 CST) (on file with author) (regarding meeting on Kennedy Heights).
101 Memorandum from John J. Tintera, Assistant Dir., Site Remediation, R.R. Comm'n of
Tex., to Brenda Loudermilk, Special Counsel, R.R. Comm'n of Tex. (on file with author) (draft
regarding status of Kennedy Heights investigation).
102 Memorandum from John J. Tintera, supra note 101.
103 Id.
104 The EPA's final report on the site indicated that "[m]ethane has been reported at
concentrations ranging from 25,000 to 480,000 parts per million (ppm) in samples collected by
the residents' contractors." ECOLOGY & ENV'T, INC., supra note 46, at 3-3.
105 R.R. Comm'n of Tex., Kennedy Heights Summary (Nov. 1995) (on fie with author).
106 Id.
107 Id.
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Table 1. Resident Concerns
Kennedy Heights
Regarding Chevron Sampling Proposals for
Chevron Date Resident Concerns
Proposal I
Methane
Investigation
Proposal
(resubmitted as
Installation of
Gas Monitoring
Wells for the
Measurement of
Methane
Concentration
and Flux Rates
from Soil)
September 9,
1995 (revised
October 11,
1995 and
resubmitted
December 7,
1995)
_____________ A L
Comprehensive
Work Plan for
Kennedy Heights
Subdivision
October 18,
1996 (3d Draft)
" TNRCC regulations for residential exposure
limits should be considered to determine
acceptable levels of contamination
* TNRCC should be involved due to the presence
of chlorinated hydrocarbons
* Chevron uses random rather than systematic
sampling and too few samples within pits
* There is no effort to locate the boundaries of the
former pits
" Monitor wells are too shallow at 5 feet
" Chevron attempted to abandon a sampling effort
in previous testing
* Further testing should include tight grid of 50
feet for soil borings, borings where ETI sampled,
borings and wells up to 14 feet, mapping of
petroleum contaminated soils, testing for TPH
using methods 418.1 and GC 8015B (before this
only used 418.1)1'
108 Id.
109 R.R. Comm'n of Tex., Summary of Residents Representatives Methane Comments (Mar.
20, 1996) (on file with author).
110 Letter from Kennedy Heights Residents Representatives, to R.R. Comm'n of Tex. (Apr. 3,
1996) (on file with author).
Vapor phase hydrocarbons are from 2-11 feet
with random, thin, and discontinuous
distribution
i Pockets of liquid and residual hydrocarbons are
at 5-26 feet; sampling is too shallow at 4-10 feet
• Three wells is inadequate
" Need in situ and discrete samples with depth
instead of 5 foot screens, to avoid dilution of
samples
* Samples will vent; will not be able to measure
concentration, generation, or flux
* Should test for a greater variety of PAHs
* Vertical averaging will depress values
" Fractures in clay can intersect methane pockets,
allow gas to migrate to homes with cracked
slabs
" Methane will be generated until food source
(hydrocarbons) is removed'
Concerns post-investigation:
* Systematic tight grid approach not used
" Chevron "abandoned" sampling if no results,
reported "no vapor" when should state "no
sample"
* Calculations for generation of methane based on
inappropriate assumptions
" Soil descriptions, video tapes do not support
statement that grass roots caused elevated levels
of methane
" Comments that subsurface methane would
render landscape barren are unsupported
" Neglects methane accumulations beneath
f.nndanhinn'
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Residents' representatives and RRC staff were able to comment on
several iterations of Chevron proposals, although this process was
disjointed. RRC records indicate that certain meetings to discuss sampling
efforts were held exclusively among Chevron and RRC representatives.' As
sampling began, RRC and resident representatives were present to observe
Chevron's efforts and to split samples for their own analysis when desired."2
RRC adopted a statistical sampling frame for split samples, in addition to
splitting samples with visible contamination.
On December 7, 1995, an RRC staff member learned that he had the
authority to contract for equipment and materials needed to analyze the soil
samples for methane gas and other contaminants that RRC planned to split
with Chevron."3 The official was also told, "[iut is understood that the cost of
this operation shall not exceed $2,500.00." 114 At the same time, an attorney
for the plaintiffs requested that RRC observe certain sampling efforts on
behalf of residents.'15  Some of RRC's final preparations included
coordinating plans for responding to media interest. Interoffice
correspondence regarding sampling activities would often include a
characterization of media interest and any RRC response. Before testing
started, an RRC official told Chevron's public affairs representative that his
plan was to "respond to media inquiries about the RRC monitoring role in
this but to refer questions about the testing, sampling, analysis, timetable,
etc. to him.""' By December 15, Chevron's methane investigation was
ongoing with what had become four gas wells installed."7
Testing continued from mid-December 1995 to February 15, 1996.
Preliminary data yielded 4,000 to 5,000 parts per million (ppm) methane
1 For example, meetings held in May of 1996 and December of 1995 included only RRC,
Chevron, and consulting firm representatives. R.R. Comm'n of Tex., Sign-in Sheet for
RRC/Chevron Kennedy Heights Meeting (May 13, 1996) (on file with author); R.R. Comm'n of
Tex., Sign-in Sheet for Kennedy Heights Chevron Technical Meeting (Dec. 6, 1995) (on file with
author).
112 See, e.g., E-mail from John J. Tintera, Assistant Dir., Site Remediation, R. R. Comm'n of
Texas, to Kennedy Heights listserv (Dec. 21, 1995, 11:52 CST) (on file with author) ("It is
anticipated that the plaintiffs['] representatives will also be on-site and will request to split gas
samples with Chevron for seperate [sic] analysis.... Soil samples split with the RRC during last
week[']s activities are being forwarded to Core Lab for independent analysis."). Some of the
questions raised regarding split samples were whether Chevron would provide sample
containers to RRC, whether they would be loaded under RRC observation, and whether
Chevron would avoid RRC's personnel decontamination.
113 Letter from John James Tintera, Deputy Assistant Dir., Site Remediation, R.R. Comm'n of
Tex., to Guy Grossman, Dist. Dir., R.R. Comm'n of Tex. (Dec. 7, 1995) (on file with author).
114 Id.
115 Memorandum from Jeb Boyt, Staff Attorney, R.R. Comm'n of Tex., to Carole Keeton
Rylander, Chairman, Barry Williamson, Comm'r & Charles R. Matthews, Comm'r, R.R. Comm'n
of Tex. (Dec. 8, 1995) (on file with author).
116 E-mail from Brian Schaible to COMW.DEESJ, David Beshear & Scott B. White (Dec. 8,
1995, 12:08 CST) (on file with author) (regarding Kennedy Heights).
117 E-mail from John J. Tintera, Assistant Dir., Site Remediation, R.R. Comm'n of Texas, to
RED.KeUyM, David Beshear, COMW.DEESJ & COM.HACHTMA (Dec. 15, 1995, 15:42 CST) (on
file with author) (regarding Kennedy Heights update).
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recovered from the monitor wells over the pits.1"' This was far below the
level that RRC considered "explosive" (50,000 ppm) but it was believed "a
greater concentration than Chevron anticipated measuring." 119 Data also
showed two of twenty-five samples in excess of 1% TPH.12° As Chevron
periodically repeated its sampling procedures, a ritual ensued where RRC
Site Remediation personnel unlocked the wells, monitored sampling
activities along with plaintiffs' representatives, and requested split samples
when visual contamination was noted. Occasionally, problems were
reported. For example, instrument problems at the laboratory used by RRC
meant that certain samples had to be shipped to a Corpus Christi lab for
analysis.121 These samples were shipped to Corpus Christi, then to Louisiana,
and back to Corpus Christi.'22 RRC officials questioned the integrity of the
samples and were told that there would be no charge for them.12 On another
occasion, Chevron told the other parties that a sample was insufficient and
wanted to re-sample. 12 RRC representatives noticed visible contamination
in the sample "and insisted and received split samples with residents." 125
Another problem concerned the effects of the wells on samples and methane
readings. In mid-January 1996, field reports indicated that three of the four
monitoring wells were partially filled with water. RRC officials indicated that
they would ask Chevron about "what effect the water is having on the
integrity of the testing."126
Methane testing ended with samples showing a maximum of 23,000
ppm methane at five feet, taken in an area where plaintiffs also encountered
high levels.127 RRC personnel reported that surrounding tests indicated that
the comparatively high concentrations were localized. 128 Elevated TPH was
found at levels up to 5,990 ppm129 (recall that preliminary data in two
samples showed 10,000 ppm, or 1% TPH).13° By the close of the investigation,
118 E-mail from John J. Tintera, Assistant Dir., Site Remediation, R.R. Comm'n of Tex., to
Kennedy Heights listserv (Jan. 10, 1996, 09:13 CST) (on file with author) (regarding Kennedy
Heights status update).
119 Id.
120 E-mail from John J. Tintera, supra note 112 (regarding upcoming activities at Kennedy
Heights).
121 E-mail from Art Correa, to MIERTSCHINW & John J. Tintera, Assistant Dir., Site
Remediation, R.R. Comm'n of Tex. (Jan. 17, 1996, 08:55 CST) (on file with author) (regarding
Kennedy Heights core lab samples).
122 E-mail from Art Correa, to MIERTSCI-INW & John J. Tintera, Assistant Dir., Site
Remediation, R.R. Comm'n of Tex. (Jan. 17, 1996, 09:28 CST) (on file with author).
123 Id.
124 Letter from Kennedy Height Residents' Representatives, supra note 110.
125 Id.
126 E-mail from Art Correa to MIERTSCHINW & John J. Tintera, Assistant Dir., Site
Remediation, R.R. Comm'n of Tex. (Jan. 24, 1996, 14:33 CST) (on file with author).
127 E-mail from John J. Tintera, Assistant Dir., Site Remediation, R.R. Comm'n of Tex., to
Kennedy Heights listserv (Feb. 16, 1996, 08:35 CST) (on file with author) (regarding Kennedy
Heights status update).
128 Id
129 E-mail from John J. Tintera, Assistant Dir., Site Remediation, R.R. Comm'n of Tex., to
Kennedy Heights listserv (Feb. 21, 1996, 14:48 CST) (on file with author).
130 Id
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the highest concentrations of TPH found by Chevron and RRC were 29,000
ppm and 24,000 ppm, respectively.' Exploration Technologies, Inc., a
consulting firm hired by the plaintiffs, found levels as high as 32,060 ppm, in
addition to "liquid product" (crude oil) at several locations. 12 It is difficult to
draw conclusions directly from these numbers, particularly since liquid
product was never officially verified by RRC. We know that a 1993 RRC rule
provided for cleanup of "non-sensitive" areas when TPH levels exceeded
10,000 ppm.1 Kennedy Heights was a sensitive area, implying that a lower
threshold should be applied, albeit with adherence to specific risk-based
decision making rules and procedures.3" A lower threshold was suggested
by RRC District Manager Guy Grossman. 3 5 However, the rule (Statewide
Rule 91) did not apply to spills that occurred before November 1, 1993.136
In March 1996, RRC met with Chevron to discuss the second phase of
the investigation. Chevron's plan included an evaluation of all three pits with
ten shallow groundwater monitoring wells, thirty-three hollow stem auger
soil samples, and twenty-four cone penetration tests.3 7 The overall goal of
this phase was to "conduct a detailed toxicological risk assessment that will
address the presence and distribution of contaminants, any exposure risk to
131 R. R. Comm'n of Tex., Summaries of Analyses by Party (Dec. 1995 and Apr. 1996) (on file
with author).
132 Exploratioi Technologies, Inc., Bore Hole Locations, Pit Number 1 (Aug. 15, 1995) (draft
prepared for O'Quinn, Kerensky, McAninch & Laminak) (on file with author).
133 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.91(b) (1993). Statewide Rule (SWR) 91 criteria are for crude oil
spills in "non-sensitive" areas and include removal of all free oil immediately according to SWR
91 guidelines, horizontal and vertical delineation of all areas with more than 1% TPH (10,000
ppm), and proper reporting. Id. § 3.91(c), (e); R.R. Comm'n of Tex., Field Guide for the
Assessment and Cleanup of Soil and Groundwater Contaminated with Condensate from a Spill
Incident, available at http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/divisions/og/key-programs/spillcleanup.html.
134 See Flynn & Dawson, supra note 97 (quoting the district manager of the Railroad
Commission of Texas as saying that Kennedy Heights would probably be considered a
"sensitive area" and therefore qualify for cleanup of its contamination below 10,000 ppm).
135 Id
136 For spills that did qualify for cleanup under the rule, RRC provided the following advice:
Statewide Rule 91 distinguishes two categories of spills: (a) crude oil spills into non-
sensitive areas; and (b) (i) hydrocarbon condensate spills and (ii) crude oil spills in
sensitive areas. Rule 91 establishes clear goals for cleanup of crude oil spills in non-
sensitive areas: immediate removal of all free oil, immediate vertical and horizontal
delineation; specifying the "area of contamination" that must be delineated and disposed
of or remediated, and specification of a final cleanup level of "1% by weight total
petroleum hydrocarbon." Rule 91 is less clear about the second category of spills.
It stands to reason that hydrocarbon condensate spills and crude oil spills in
sensitive areas, which pose greater risks, should at least follow standards established for
the equally important but less threatening spills.
R.R. Comm'n of Tex., supra note 133. Yet the same residential and industrial limits are given for
TPH and BETX, a group of particularly toxic compounds associated with the processing of
crude oil (benzene, ethylbenzene, toluene, and xylene). Id
137 E-mail from John J. Tintera, Assistant Dir., Site Remediation, R.R. Comm'n of Tex., to
Kennedy Heights listserv (Mar. 19, 1996, 07:46 CST) (on file with author) (regarding Kennedy
Heights status).
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residents, and surface or subsurface water pollution."' 38 Sixty days of
fieldwork were planned to gather data to allow for a more comprehensive
investigation of site contamination. RRC and Chevron worked out field
operations so that representatives would be present for surveying, probing,
and sampling. Again, RRC officials described budgetary constraints that "will
limit us to five samples."13 9 The parties started with the northwest pit for one
week and then moved into the neighborhood.
C. Phase H of the RRC-Chevron Investigation Commences
In response to concerns about drinking water, Chevron's
Comprehensive Work Plan included a proposal to collect samples from the
outside hose bibs of thirteen selected homes "as soon as reasonably
possible, but no later than 24 hours after a water line break has been
repaired in the Kennedy Heights subdivision." 114 The company also offered
free drinking water testing to residents whose homes were located in the
general area of the northeast pit. Plaintiffs opposed the sampling program,
claiming that it was "unlikely to detect contamination at any home not
affected by a specific pipeline break."141 More importantly, it would have
"limited utility in determining how much contaminated water has entered
homes in Kennedy Heights during the last twenty-five years." 142 Residents
forwarded approximately eighty letters, originally mailed to TNRCC and to
the Houston District Office of RRC, requesting cleanup of contamination at
Kennedy Heights." Fifty residents attended a technical meeting regarding
Chevron's Work Plan, again questioning the risk assessment and its ability to
appropriately characterize sporadic contamination entering residential lines
after water main breaks.144 At a pre-hearing conference in Houston,
residents' attorneys claimed that the hearing process lacked ground rules,
138 Id.
139 E-mail from Art Correa to MIERTSCHINW & John J. Tintera, Assistant Dir., Site
Remediation, R.R. Conum'n of Tex. (Mar. 22, 1996, 10:41 CST) (on file with author). In
discussing bids for Kennedy Heights sampling, officials noted:
As of 10:00 am. we have received three bids. The low bidder is a hub-Chemsolve from
[Alustin. Bid is for $ 481 for either fluid or soil samples. The amount we are authorized
will limit us to 5 samples. Bids have been signed and amounts double checked for
accuracy. Any suggestions on what criteria we can document to award it as lowest and
best bidder. Bidding is officially closed at 10:10 am. after checking fax machine and with
SR & SRT personnel from any other bids.
Id.
140 Fluor Daniel GTI, Comprehensive Work Plan for Kennedy Heights Subdivision, Third
Draft (Oct. 18,1996) (prepared for Chevron U.S.A. Production Company) (on fe with author).
141 Letter from Allen Eli Bell, Attorney, Bernsen, Jamail & Goodson, L.L.P., to Terri Eaton,
Assistant Dir., Envtl. Section, Office of Gen. Counsel, R.R. Comm'n of Tex. (June 4, 1996) (on
file with author).
142 Id
143 E-mail from John J. Tintera, Assistant Dir., Site Remediation, R.R. Comm'n of Tex., to
COMW.OGGREENSHEET (May 9,1996,14:47 CST) (on file with author).
144 E-mail from John J. Tintera, Assistant Dir., Site Remediation, R.R. Comm'n of Tex., to
COMW.OGGREENSHEET (May 23, 1996, 14:41 CST) (on file with author).
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standards, or a clear burden of proof.'45 Residents withdrew from the
hearing, but implored RRC to continue its efforts, stating "[t]here is plenty of
data right now to move forward."146
D. Comparison of Results by Party
Upon conclusion of sampling over each pit by the various consultants,
RRC prepared summaries of the contamination. Tables 2 through 4 provide
an overview of the highest concentration of several compounds of interest,
summarized by RRC.
Table 2. Highest Concentration Found As Proportion of TNRCC
Regulatory Limit, Northeast Pit (ppm)
Chevron RRC ETI city PSI
TPH at
Surface 1,453 800 7,797 590
TPH 29,000" 24,000* 91720
43.49*1107 .212*/1.33
VOC (Methylene - (Benzene)
Chloride) Toluene)
39.18/45.7 (Bis 33*/.00608 2.649*/.00608
S-VOC 2-ethyihexyl (Bis 2- (Bis 2-
phthalate) ethy ihexyl) ethylhexyl)
Total 11.7*/.366 2.5*/.366 .450*/.366
Metal (Arsenic) (Arsenic) (Arsenic)
2.99*/.005 .009*/.005 (1,2
SPLP (dichloroethane)
VOC (Methylene .037/.005 (MethylChloride) Chloride)
SPLP .021*/.006 (Bis
S-VOC 2-ethylhexylphthalate)
.004*/.002
SPLP .24/2.0 (Mercury)Metal (Barium) 1.7/2.0 (Barium)2351*/300
(Sulfates)
.016/.1
DW (Chloroform),
VOC, .012*/. 00608 (Bis
S-VOC, 2-ethylhexyl),
Metal .001/.05
(Arsenic)
145 E-mail from John J. Tintera, Assistant Dir., Site Remediation, R.R. Comm'n of Tex., to
Terri Eaton, Assistant Dir., Envtl. Section, Office of Gen. Counsel, R.R. Comm'n of Tex.,
LG.JohnsonB, LG.FowlerL, SchieckD & Wrotenb (Nov. 17, 1996, 12:45 CST) (on file with
author) (regarding Kennedy Heights pre-hearing conference).
146 Id.
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Table 3. Highest Concentration Found as Proportion of TNRCC
Regulatory Limit, NW Pit (ppm)
Chevron RRC ETI
TPH at Surface 3,674 11100 636
TPH 23,450* 18,000* 321060*
36.63*/10.7
(Methylene Chloride)
19.39/45.7 33*/.00608 (Bis 2-
(Bis 2-ethylhexyl phthalate) ethylhexyl)
Total Metal 11.4*/.366 (Arsenic) 2.5*/.366 (Arsenic)
4.07*/.005
(Methylene Chloride)
.0068*/.006
(Bis 2-ethylhexyl phthalate)
1.2/2 (Barium)
TCLP Metal 303*/300(Sulfates)
Table 4. Highest Concentration Found as Proportion of TNRCC
Regulatory Limit, SE Pit (ppm)
Chevron RRC ETI
TPH at Surface 24 200 31
TPH value 31 200 8
VOC 5.99/10.7 (Methylene
VChloride)
6.99/45.7
(Bis 2-ethylhexyl phthalate)
Total Metal 12.1*/.366 (arsenic) -
4.14*/.005
(Methylene Chloride)
.01198*/.006
(Bis 2-ethylhexyl phthalate)
2678*/300
TCLP Metal (Sulfates)
305*/300
(Chlorides)
TPH Total Petroleum Hydrocarbons
S-VOC Total Volatile Organic
Compounds
SPLP Synthetic Precipitate
Leaching Procedure, an
analytic method to determine
the mobility of compounds in
soil
DW Drinking Water
VOC Volatile Organic Compound
DW Drinldng Water
TCLP Toxicity Characteristic
Leaching Procedure, an
analytic method to determine
metal mobility
no hits or test for this
compound
* above TNRCC regulatory limits (number below / represents limit); numbers
for TPH with a * are above RRC guidelines for non-sensitive areas; at the time,
sensitive areas were assessed on a case-by-case basis
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While some compounds had levels exceeding regulatory standards for
both declared and suspected human carcinogens (as indicated by an asterisk
in Tables 2 through 4), RRC determined, through analysis of a risk
assessment performed by Chevron, that the levels of contamination did not
pose a sufficient threat to human health to warrant remedial action.147 Prior
to completion of Chevron's Work Plan, RRC responded to the concerns of
State Senator Rodney Ellis regarding the anticipated risk assessment. The
Assistant Director of the Environmental Section of RRC described risk
assessment as follows:
No single risk assessment model will account for site-specific variables in all
cases, including those at Kennedy Heights. However, risk assessment
techniques are designed to be adjusted to accommodate site-specific variables.
Commission staff has experience evaluating site-specific risk assessments,
including assessments of risk to nearby residents from surface and subsurface
contaminants. If a thorough risk assessment of the residual contamination at
Kennedy Heights indicates that the residents are or may be exposed to
constituents of concern at unacceptable levels, appropriate remedial measures
will be required.14
RRC's evaluation of Chevron's risk assessment led them to conclude that
residents were not exposed to unacceptable levels of hydrocarbons, a
finding echoed years later in EPA's risk assessment.149 Residents were left to
seek relief through the courts.
IV. THE LIMITS OF SITE CHARACTERIZATION AND RISK ASSESSMENT IN KENNEDY
HEIGHTS
The above account of site investigations conducted by multiple
agencies, jurisdictions, and consulting firms represents only one side of the
Kennedy Heights story. 1 50 The value in piecing together this particular
147 COMPLIANCE SOLUTIONS, INC., ADDENDUM TO BASE LINE RISK ASSESSMENT FOR THE KENNEDY
HEIGHTS SUBDIVISION I (1997) (on file with author) (prepared for Chevron USA Production
company). "CSI concluded that while weathered crude oil is present in some portions of the
Subdivision, it does not present a significant risk to the health of the residents." Id.; Letter from
Denis6 Guervia for William B. Allison, Partner, Allison & Shoemaker, L.L.P. to Terri K Eaton,
Assistant Dir., Office of Gen. Counsel, R. R. Comm'n of Tex. (Oct. 2, 1997) (on file with author)
(regarding Addendum to Base Line Risk Assessment for the Kennnedy Heights Subdivision
(Final Draft)).
148 Letter from Terri K. Eaton, Assistant Dir., Envtl. Section, Office of Gen. Counsel, R.R.
Comm'n of Tex., to William-Paul Thomas, Chief of Staff, Office of Senator Rodney Ellis (June 7,
1996) (on file with author).
149 ECOLOGY & ENV'T, INC., supra note 46, at 5-2.
150 For example, on March 23, 1999, roughly 2,400 plaintiffs met at the Hofheinz Pavillion
basketball court at the University of Houston and were asked to accept a settlement. Chambers'
Plaintiffs' Response to Motion to Withdraw of John O'Quinn from their Representation as their
Counsel at 6, Adams v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., No. 96-1462 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 2000). An attorney
asked the group to pause and recite the Prayer for Serenity ("Lord, grant me the serenity to
accept the things I cannot change, courage to change the things I can, and wisdom to know the
difference."). Most residents were too broken to protest the choice they would have to make:
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sequence of events lies in its demonstration of how pragmatic
considerations as well as factual uncertainty can overshadow objective
analysis as parties move to investigate a contaminated site. The primary
dynamics at work as the site assessment process unfolded in Kennedy
Heights included a growing disconnect between residents' concerns and the
sampling frame choices made by contractors, RRC-Chevron interaction, and
interpreting findings from the first two phases of the investigation through
risk assessment methodologies developed by consulting firms for Chevron.
A. The Importance of Sampling Fiame Choice
Much of the variance in results gathered by parties operating in
Kennedy Heights can be attributed to the choice of sampling frame by each
consulting firm. 1 This was anticipated in the difference of opinion between
RRC, residents, and Chevron as the parties set up the Methane Investigation
Proposal. RRC expressed doubt over the time frame, volumes collected per
tube, approximate location of the soil borings (which Chevron did not
specify), Chevron's rationale for limiting its samples to four feet (when
initial findings were in the two to seven foot range), its decision to sample at
one to two month intervals, and the absence of any plan to determine the
origin of the gas. Residents shared these concerns, particularly because their
consultants found vapor phase hydrocarbons at two to eleven feet "with
random, thin, and discontinuous distribution" and pockets of liquid
hydrocarbons at five to twenty-six feet.152 There was clear concern over
possible sample dilution, which led residents to propose an in situ as
opposed to a five foot screen approach and to predict that the wells would
vent, fill with rainwater, and necessitate vertical averaging that would
further depress values." Sure enough, Chevron only set up four gas wells
for use over thirteen months, three of which filled with water." RRC's only
recorded response was to note that they would ask Chevron about
rainwater's effects on sample integrity. 155
Residents reiterated their concerns post-sampling as well.156 First,
Chevron did not use a grid approach commonly applied by the industry. 157
either accept their settlement, or become pro se (representing themselves, should the court
grant motions by O'Quinn and associates to withdraw as counsel) in a case that, should it
proceed, would begin by considering challenges to the admissibility of evidence. Letter from
John M. O'Quinn, Partner, O'Quinn & Laminack, to Deirdre M. Jones, Client (July 28, 2000) (on
file with author).
151 Sampling frames concern how, for example, soil samples will be taken from a geographic
area. Questions of timing, tools used, and horizontal and vertical spacing are considered in
order to increase the likelihood that a contaminant, if present in the soil, will be detected and its
location pinpointed.
152 See supra Table 1 (listing residents' concerns about Chevron sampling proposals).
153 Id.
154 Id
155 See supra notes 124-126 and accompanying text.
156 See supra Table 1 (listing residents' post-investigation concerns about Chevron sampling
proposals).
157 Id.
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Consultants for the residents employed this approach, described by a
scientist at Exploration Technologies, Inc.
We began with a, it might have been a fifty-foot sampling grid, and what we did
was map the various components, the methane, ethane, propane, butanes, and
what we call C5+, the pentanes through xylene plus hydrocarbons, and of
course the methane turned out to be the best indicator, again, the anaerobic
degradation product of the crude oil, and what it indicated to us, and the
purpose of doing the soil gas survey was to determine or delineate the aerial
extent of the contamination in the subsurface... we do this first because we do
not want to go out and install borings and/or install monitoring wells at
random. 158
There were also problems with sampling decisions made during the
thirteen month period. Residents protested the fact that Chevron recorded
abandoned sampling efforts as "no vapor" instead of "no sample" and based
their sampling frame on methane generation assumptions not shared by
residents or RRC. 159 Perhaps most troubling to residents was Chevron's
neglect of methane accumulations under housing foundations." ° Questions
such as where to locate soil borings, what depths they should reach, and
how often they should be collected are closely tied to the narrative of
contamination that one is trying to construct. A community representative
articulated the narrative for soil gas location as follows:
We did a fifty-foot grid, but those little insets indicate that the contamination was
so, I don't want to use the term random, but unpredictable, because what
happened was they had these pits dug, and what ihey dug out they put as a berm
around the pits. They filled the pits to well beyond the pit itself so that actually
the crude oil was up into the berms. When they were ready to close those pits,
they just bulldozed everything back into the pits. So if you can imagine, the best
analogy I can give you is a vanilla and chocolate marble cake. So when they
bulldozed all the berms back into the pit, now what you have is your chocolate is
your product, or your crude oil saturated soils, that are now mixed in with your
vanilla, which is less contaniated or possibly uncontaminated soils, so it's very
difficult to predict where these pockets of product exist... we did some drilling,
bore hole drilling after we finished our soil gas survey, and we did it based upon
our soil gas anomalies, and I personally was present and collected samples on
three particular bore holes which were drilled four feet apart. One on the, off the
sidewalk but on someone's lawn, then moved over four feet to the west, and both
were contaminated, the cores were dripping crude oil, moved over four feet
again, and got nothing. That's how quickly you could go from contaminated soil
to relatively clean soil.161
158 Telephone Interview with Consultant, Exploration Technologies, Inc. (May 10, 2002) (on
file with author).
159 See supra Table 1 (listing residents' post-investigation concerns about Chevron sampling
proposals).
160 Id
161 Telephone Interview with Consultant, supra note 158.
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The possibility that soil gas locations could be randomly dispersed
across the subdivision led-scientists hired by residents to express concern
over the likelihood of methane pockets.1 62 Methane pockets, when reaching
a level indicative of explosive potential, would be extremely dangerous if
located under single family homes. Yet the Chevron Methane Investigation
Proposal and Comprehensive Work Plan did not outline a plan to test
housing foundations."6 Nor did they account for exposure to vapors from
degrading crude oil (in the form of ambient air sampling inside the homes
located over the pits), hydrocarbon transport from soil to drinking water
through water main breaks (by providing random drinking water testing
throughout portions of the subdivision following a line break), or the
discontinuous location of hydrocarbons and other soil gases (that could only
be characterized through grid sampling). 164 Collectively, these early choices
by Chevron, questioned by RRC but ultimately accepted, meant that resident
understandings of their subdivision and fears regarding possible exposure
pathways (drinking water and showers following pipe ruptures, inhalation
from sub-foundation soil entering homes) and dangers (explosive levels of
methane in housing foundations) were effectively excluded from
consideration. This narrowing of potential findings occurred before the
remainder of RRC's decisions, made almost exclusively with Chevron
representatives, further limited the ability of RRC to characterize sporadic
contamination entering resident lines after water main breaks.
By the time sampling efforts commenced, it was too late for residents to
introduce protocols to investigate the validity of the above narratives. For
example, residents' consultants produced a map of their fifty-foot grid, with
bore hole locations over the NE pit (bisected by Murr Way and Lockgate
Lane, the site of the bulk of the lupus cases). 6 5 The map indicates that
"liquid product," or crude oil, was found at 11302 Murr Way (at eight to ten
feet), 11303 Murr Way (twenty-four feet), 11315 Murr Way (ten and twenty-
six feet), 11323 Murr Way (six to nine feet), 11322 Murr Way (five to eight
feet), and 11323 Lockgate Lane (eight to ten feet). 166
During joint testing by RRC and Chevron, ETI workers asked a RRC
official for permission to demonstrate where the liquid product was located
and were told that they lacked a work plan and had not submitted the
requisite number of hours preceding their sampling activities.'67 On
December 13, 1995, RRC notes discuss this encounter: "[Residents] want to
spl[it] (core soils) [within] and aclj[acent] to Chevron [monitoring well] @
11323 MW. We have mtg.-Chevron say core rig disturb their well-I say we
are implement[ing] Chevron plan and want to maintain interpret[ation] of
Chevron data-but [in] the next round of assessment we may address
162 See supra Table 1 (listing residents' concerns about Chevron sampling proposals).
163 Fluor Daniel GTI, supra note 140.
164 Id
165 Exploration Technologies, Inc., supra note 132.
166 Id.
167 Telephone Interview with Consultant, supra note 158.
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this."'68 Such an effort was not made, although later the EPA agreed that
"visible hydrocarbons" were present in some of the samples.
169
B. Site Characterization and RiskAssessment As a Negotiated Process
Between RRC and Chevron
The Assistant Director of Site Remediation for RRC described a typical
day of sampling at the subdivision as follows:
Early in the morning, various parties, RRC, Chevron, Chevron's contractors,
residents' representatives, and the residents' contractors would meet for a
safety meeting and go over the daily activities that would go on there. RRC
would have at least one, sometimes 2 or 3 representatives on site to witness the
activities and keep records and then the sampling plans would proceed.., our
role was primarily monitoring. Of course, there's media attention and things
like that. Occasionally we would have to answer questions like that. 170
This image of parity in sampling and coordination across parties is not
present in fifteen months of RRC correspondence documents, which focus
primarily on media attention, RRC questions regarding cost and method,
and, most importantly, the ongoing negotiation between Chevron and RRC
over sampling protocol.
1. Media Attention
Field notes taken on-site and later represented in electronic
correspondence often included the indication "no media attention" or "no
media on-site." I"' Occasionally, media interest is noted, such as in a
December 12, 1995, entry: "Chevron has staked locations for about two
thirds of the locations for soil samples and monitoring wells.... High media
interest-so far the questions have been directed at Chevron and plaintiffs,
not our folks."72 In addition, there are entries that describe situations that
could potentially spark media interest:
As of 8:00 a.m. this morning, everything is running smooth at KH. Yesterday
Patty reported that the picket signs that were used last week have now been
placed on the curbs of the residential area.... Between yesterday and this
morning all monitor wells on the Northwest Pit have been evacuated.
173
168 R.R. Comm'n of Tex., Handwritten Field Notes (Dec. 13, 1995) (on file with author).
169 ECOLOGY & ENV'T, INC., supra note 46, at 5-1.
170 Telephone Interview with Site Remediation Official, R.R. Conm'n of Tex. (May 3, 2002).
171 See, e.g, E-mail from John J. Tintera, supra note 127. ("There was no media attention
yesterday, and only FOX TV was at the neighborhood this week for a short interview with
Chevron personnel.").
172 E-mail from Brian Schaible, to COMW.DEESJ, David Beshear & Scott White (Dec. 12,
1995, 14:50 CST) (on file with author) (regarding Kennedy Heights).
173 E-mail from Art Correa to MIERTSCHINW & John J Tintera, Assistant Dir., Site
Remediation, R.R. Comm'n of Tex. (Apr. 4, 1996) (on file with author).
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The event most likely to encourage media involvement would be a finding of
"explosive levels" of methane at Kennedy Heights. Entries in RRC field notes
sometimes contained a notation that "no explosive levels" were found to
date. 74 RRC internal correspondence also outlines meetings with Chevron
representatives and other discussions regarding what RRC planned to say to
certain parties (including the media) should they be asked about the
process.
[December 8, 1995:] [Tlalked with Mickey Driver, Chevron public affairs rep in
Houston this morning. They are putting out a media advisory today outlining
what's going to happen next week.... I told Driver my plan was to respond to
.media inquiries about the RRC monitoring roles in this but to refer questions
about the testing, sampling, analysis, timetable, etc. to him. He said that was
fie.... Driver is highlighting the methane aspect and sticking to the Chevron
party lines that there's no evidence anything else is there that poses a health
risk.1
75
[December 6, 1995:] Kennedy Heights Technical Meeting notes. Noon on
Monday[.] Any violence leave[.] Safety #1[.] ... Any questions about Chevron's
plan will be referred to Chevron. What to say: We are on top of the situation[.]
Monitoring the situation[.] Long as it takes[.] Chevron foot the bill not the tax
payers[.] ... Pick worst looking samples for analysis. Sample splitting priority:
1. Chevron 2. Plaintiff 3. RRC .... Soil gas permeability we will not be involved
in. 176
[August 25, 1995:] [Clontacted by John Cambell, an adjacent landowner, at KH,
requesting information on the meeting with Chevron.... I'll provide the
following information: "Commission staff met with Chevron representatives
this Wednesday. The outcome of the meeting is that the Commission expects
Chevron to submit a plan shortly (within weeks or days) which will include
additional assessment activities as well as address safety concerns." If pressed
for additional info I'll take the stance that it would be premature to speculate
until the proposed plan is received, if pressed further I will refer the caller to
Office of Information Services. 177
2. RRC Questions
As RRC sought to manage perception of its involvement and determine
what information it would share with various parties, it also tried to make
sense of its role vis-A-vis Chevron and its contractors. No entry in the RRC
correspondence files concerns a request for information made by Chevron
to RRC staff. On the other hand, RRC readily inquired into the feasibility or
174 See, e.g., E-mail from John J. Tintera, supra note 129 ("Preliminary raw field data indicate
that no explosive levels of methane gas were encountered").
175 E-mail from Brian Schaible, supra note 116.
176 R.R. Comm'n of Tex., Meeting with Chevron, Handwritten Notes (Dec. 6, 1995) (on file
with author).
177 E-mail from John J. Tintera, Assistant Dir., Site Remediation, R.R. Comm'n of Tex., to
Scott White, COMW.DEESJ & David Beshear (Aug. 25, 1995, 11:33 CST) (on file with author)
(regarding Kennedy Heights inquiry).
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relative merits of methods and approaches throughout the site
characterization process. RRC also struggled with severe resource
constraints and sampling and analysis problems that arose with some
frequency:
[November 20, 1995:] I finished reviewing the Chevron proposal on Sample
Testing. The problem is I won't know anything about our lab capability's [sic] till
[sic] Carl N[elson] gets back. 178
[November 29, 1995:] [S]poke with Carl Nelson and he said he was not equipped
to handle any of the sample testing that Chevron is proposing to do. I am waiting
on two companys [sic] to fax me their cost estimates. Core Lab is the only one to
fax their cost est[imate] and their cost for just one sample for each of the
individual tests is $1260.00.179
[December 7, 1995:] Authority to contract for equipment and materials necessary
to analyze soil samples for methane gas and other possible contaminants from an
unknown source associated with former crude oil storage pits.... It is
understood that the cost of this operation shall not exceed $2,500.180
[December 28, 1995:] RRC soil samples, obtained two weeks ago when samples
were split between Chevron, the plaintiffs, and the RRC, are being independently
analyzed by Core Lab. Results will be available within one to two weeks. Core
Lab has reported that there is insufficient sample to run all tests on 3 of the 4
samples. 181
[January 17, 1996:] Core Lab is experiencing instrument problems and will ship
the extract to the lab in Corpus. Samples that are affected are ... Sample #13 -
RRC tag# 20946... 2' to 4' soil core sample... Sample #14 - RRC tag# 20947 ... 4'
to 6' soil core sample. Analysis needed to complete work are TPH-Diesel and
SPLP-Semi-volatiles for the above Samples.18 2
[January 17, 1996:] The following questions will be addressed on the Letter we
will receive from Core Lab this morning: 1. The validity of the sample analysis. 2.
Integrity of the sample being shipped back to CC [Corpus Christi]. 3. Why were
samples shipped to CC, then to LA [Louisiana], and now back to CC. 13
[January 24, 1996:] Ray will speak with Lloyd Deuel [at Chevron] and get his
response on what effect the water is having on the integrity of the testing. Patty
178 E-mail from Art A. Correa to MIERTSCHINW & John J. Tintera, Assistant Dir., Site
Remediation, R.R. Comm'n of Tex. (Nov. 20, 1995, 16:11 CST) (on file with author).
179 E-mail from Art A. Correa to MIERTSCHINW & John J. Tintera, Assistant Dir., Site
Remediation, R.R. Comm'n of Tex. (Nov. 29, 1995, 11:57 CST) (on file with author).
180 Letter from John Tintera, Assistant Dir., Site Remediation, R.R. Comm'n of Tex., to Guy
Grossman, District Dir., R.R. Comm'n of Tex. (Dec. 7, 1995) (on file with author).
181 E-mail from John J. Tintera, Assistant Dir., Site Remediation, R.R. Comm'n of Tex., to
Kennedy Heights listserv (Dec. 28, 1995, 8:16 CST) (on file with author) (regarding Kennedy
Heights update).
182 E-mail from Art A. Correa, supra note 121.
183 Id
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left the site at 1:30 after speaking with Chevron to make sure that the sample
procedure that was changed (instead of pulling 6-5cc of volume with the syringe
sample they are pulling 6-4cc of volume) is documented.18 4
[February 20, 1996:] I'd like to go over these KH test results [Chevron's methane
investigation report].... I need to see the hotspots on the test results and...
understand exactly what the report means. 185
[March 21, 1996:] What is our next step at KH? Do we approve [Chevron's] plan,
wait on [residents'] comments? Their recent letter still leaves open ended when
RRC will receive additional info. Let's request a status update report in 60 days.
186
[March 22, 1996:] As of 10:00 am. we have received three bids. The low bidder is
a hub-Chemsolve from [A]ustin. Bid is for $481 for either fluid or soil samples.
The amount we are authorized will limit us to 5 samples. Bids have been signed
and amounts double checked for accuracy. Any suggestions on what criteria we
can document to award it as lowest and best bidder. 187
[April 5, 1996:] A review of the analyses from various test samples in the Kennedy
Heights Subdivision indicates concentrations of organic compounds that may be
due to laboratory contamination or the addition of the compound as internal
standards [1,2 Dichloroethane and Methylene chloride].... Therefore, it is
suggested that samples be taken from the same locations by equipment that has
not been cleaned with solvents ....'8s
[May 9, 1996:] Do you have a copy of the KH samples we sent out with the wrong
address sever[all months ago? I can't find mine. Also, please check with Carl
Nelson on status of when current samples will be completed. I'm getting media
and Commissioner requests for info.1 89
3. Lack of Balance in the RRC/Chevron Relationship
Resource and knowledge constraints left the RRC at a disadvantage as it
tried to negotiate the scope of Chevron's investigation. Chevron's
Comprehensive Work Plan contained several glaring omissions, according to
RRC staff.19 Further meetings (exclusively with Chevron) led to an
184 E-mail from Art A. Correa, supra note 126.
185 E-mail from David Beshear to John J. Tintera, Assistant Dir., Site Remediation, R.R.
Comm'n of Tex. (Feb. 20, 1996, 17:27 CST) (on file with author).
186 E-mail from John J. Tintera, Assistant Dir., Site Remediation, R.R. Comm'n of Tex., to
Terri Eaton, Assistant Dir., Envtl. Section, Office of Gen. Counsel, R.R. Comm'n of Tex. (Mar.
21, 1996, 08:31 CST) (on file with author).
187 E-mail from Art Correa, supra note 139.
188 E-mail from Bill Renfro to John J. Tintera, Assistant Dir., Site Remediation, R.R. Comm'n
of Tex. (Apr. 5, 1996, 16:40 CST) (on file with author) (regarding Kennedy Heights analysis).
189 E-mail from John J. Tintera, Assistant Dir., Site Remediation, R.R. Comm'n of Tex., to Art
Correa (May 9, 1996, 16:03 CST) (on file with author) (regarding Kennedy Heights samples).
190 One e-mail contained the following questions of the Comprehensive Work Plan:
Why no evaluation of migratory pathways to residents and/or surface and subsurface
waters? No toxicologic or risk assessment review of data. Need to evaluate presence and
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understanding that some of the gaps in the site assessment process would
simply be addressed at a later date: "This is viewed as preliminary to help
[Chevron] plan for a more detailed assessment activity which will culminate in
a final report that will include a detailed risk assessment." 191 But not all
concerns were addressed, as evidenced by RRC's questions following
completion of the methane investigation:
[April 8, 1996:] Chevron still needs to explain several parts of the methane
investigation, including:
- origin of methane
- why no methane maps submitted
- if soils have low perm to gas, how does it diffuse through soils
- why so many "no vapor" test and are they representative or a sampling
technique problem
- would a different sampling technique allow for higher concentrations
- further evaluation of high levels of gas where Chevron reported them...
- further explanation of soil moisture affecting perm[eability] and gas, is their
[sic] a seasonal variation, does that tie-in with no vapor reports
... Chevron claimed in one of our early meetings that since the [residents] had
already sampled extensively, Chevron wouldn't re-create those tests but would
hit the high concentrations. However, [residents] are reporting additional
sampling events with ever-higher concentrations in areas Chevron hasn't tested.
Methane concentration distribution appears highly variable. Because of the
variability, I think we need to be able to say all residences were evaluated. The
only way to do this is a sample grid with a focus adjacent to homes. 192
Sample grids were never employed at the Kennedy Heights site. This did not
keep RRC from claiming that findings of elevated PAH levels were "localized,"
despite the comparatively sporadic placement of soil borings by Chevron.
Most of the other questions raised by RRC were shared only with
Chevron at frequent technical meetings. Residents and their representatives
only commented on a handful of occasions, usually immediately after the
submission of a draft sampling plan. There is no evidence in the record of the
kind of extensive interaction that RRC and Chevron shared in 1995 and 1996,
when most of the physical sampling took place. Thus, not only were resident
narratives regarding possible exposure pathways excluded from consideration
level of contaminants and risk to residents/environment. Work plan does not address
high TPH soils, free crude oil m subsurface, crude oil contaminated groundwater, BTEX
[benzene, toluene, ethylene, and xylenel, PAH's, or other contaminants as required by
RRC letter of November 13, 1995. Report calls for only one water sampling event in
monitor wells, what about seasonal fluctuations and time? No permeability or hydraulic
conductivity testing of samples, cores, pit bottoms. Why are Hollow Stem Auger pit
samples shallow and only 8-10 feet, with no deep tests?
E-mail from John J. Tintera, Assistant Dir., Site Remediation, R.R. Comm'n of Tex., to Terri
Eaton, Assistant Dir., Envtl. Section, Office of Gen. Counsel, R.R. Comm'n of Tex. (Apr. 8, 1996,
16:57 CST) (on file with author) (regarding Kennedy Heights response).
191 Id.
192 Id
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by the broader sampling plans, but the minutiae of daily site-based decision-
making proceeded parallel but apart from resident involvement (with the
exception of resident presence at the actual sampling locations). Far from
serving as the lead stakeholder in a site investigation concerning matters
within its jurisdiction, RRC focused on taking a limited number of its own
samples, managing media relations, and asking questions of Chevron
contractors. Judging from RRC concerns that remained following the close of
the methane investigation, some of these questions, such as whether to
account for seasonal variations or the scattered location of soil gas pockets,
were not even raised until near the close of the exercise. More importantly,
residents were not made aware of the ad hoc choices made by RRC staff, such
as equipment for use in sampling and their relative merits, where to send
samples, what analytical methods to use, how to split samples (visually,
randomly, or by some other means), how Chevron would avoid violating
sample integrity, what the parties should do with diluted or questionable
samples, and how RRC could serve its chosen role as monitor most effectively
on a budget of $2,500.
C Risk Assessment: The fThal Stage in a Negotiated Process
A final narrowing of resident options occurred through analysis of the
disparate findings noted in Tables 2 through 4. By 1997, the only analytic
work to make use of the sampling data was done by Compliance Solutions,
Inc. (CSI) and transferred to RRC through attorneys for Chevron. 93 The
risk assessment concluded that "while weathered crude oil is present in
some portions of the Subdivision, it does not present a significant risk to
the health of the residents." 4 The risk assessment process did not
consider the primary health outcome of concern to Kennedy Heights
residents.
Risk assessment incorporates the best technical judgment of EPA scientists
as to what toxic effect (cancer or non-cancer) occurs at the lowest dose for
each chemical, since protecting against this most sensitive effect will afford
protection against those toxic effects that are seen only at higher levels of
exposure. In this regard, [RRC] asked whether lupus erythematosus is
considered as part of the Risk Assessment Report. Compliance Solutions has
reviewed the published literature which indicates that lupus is not
etiologically related to any of the chemicals of relevance to Kennedy
Heights. 19 5
Nor did CSI analyze samples of groundwater collected from soil borings as
part of its formal risk assessment "because of the lack of appropriate
background and regulatory criteria."19
6
193 COMPLIANCE SOLUTIONS, INC., supra note 147.
194 Id. at 1.
195 Id. at 2.
196 Id at 12.
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In addition, CSI made a number of assumptions in its risk
calculations. First, "the quality of the analytical and field information was
often unverified or the required information was not provided to us for this
risk analysis," 19 7 leading CSI to take reports from elsewhere and use them
to generate estimates of such variables as Method Detection Limits
(MDLs), the lowest levels above which a laboratory can detect the
presence of a substance in a soil or water sample."9 8 For this calculation,
CSI assumed that the ratio of MDLs to quantitation limits (the lowest level
at which a substance can be reliably measured by a given method
performed by a laboratory) was constant for each toxicant, obtaining the
latter from a quality control study from Arthur D. Little and applying the
numbers to Chevron data only (Phase 3 analytical results for select volatile
organic compounds). 99 CSI also assumed that all reported data were valid,
"unless it was clear from available records that the technical problems
associated with a specific sample made its inclusion impossible."2" It
assumed that the subdivision represented an urban rather than non-
disturbed background, based on data collected by Fluor-Daniel-GTI for
Chevron, and developed estimates of background for various chemicals
accordingly.2"' CSI then estimated 95% Upper Tolerance Limits (UTLs) for
each chemical observed in background samples, but noted that "variations
in the calculated 95% UTLs were noted, and are believed attributable to
small sample numbers and the relatively few locations sampled at
depth."2" 2 Chevron's statistician "considered 16 to be the minimum number
[of] samples necessary to develop background statistics," but in order to
achieve this number, CSI had to use Chevron's "no vapor" samples (which
residents noted were abandoned samples rather than true "non-detects") to
calculate its 95% UTLs.2°3
CSI next determined how the data were distributed using the Kruskal-
Walis statistical test.2 4 The test compares the medians of samples from
two or more groups, and answers whether all samples were taken from the
same population.20 5 While the test does not require a normal distribution in
order to test its hypothesis, it does assume that measurements come from
a continuous distribution.206 We have seen that by all accounts, the
distribution of soil vapors and certainly the sampling protocol at Kennedy
Heights were discontinuous. In addition, the test, being nonparametric,
does not allow for calculating confidence intervals, nor can it indicate to
197 Id at 3.
198 Id
199 Id. at 4.
200 Id
201 Id. at 5.
202 Id.
203 Id
204 Id at 6.
205 The MathWorks, Statistics Toolbox, Knlskal-Wallis, http://www.mathworks.con/access/
helpdesk/help/toolbox/stats/kruskalwallis.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2007).
206 Id
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what degree various measurements differ.2 °7 CSI dealt with the finding that
background concentrations "showed marked skewness to the right" by
taking the natural logarithm of each reported concentration, and
generating the mean and standard deviation of the transformed data to
calculate UTLs for the site.
20 8
CSI's primary task was to compare data from samples collected to
their 95% UTLs to "identify Potential Chemicals of Concern" (COCs).20 9 As
part of this comparison, CSI only labeled a chemical a COC if its
geographic distribution was consistent with a potential source of
contamination. 211 On the basis of one or both of these criteria-numerical
comparison and distribution-CSI did not identify any COCs among the
volatile organic compounds or semi-volatile organic compounds found at
Kennedy Heights.2" This process can be compared with the TNRCC's draft
Ecological Risk Assessment guidance document, issued in November 1996:
To evaluate the need for undertaking a response action, measured COC
concentrations are compared to the lower of the human health [Protective
Concentration Level] or ecological PCL for each COC (the lower of the two is
called the critical PCL). If measured COC concentrations exceed the critical
PCL for any COC, the person may either refine the PCLs by going to the next
tier in the risk analysis (assuming the person is at Tier 1 or 2 for human
health or Tier 2 for ecological) or implement a remedy pursuant to the [Texas
Risk Reduction Program] requirements....
... Response actions must conform to one of two options for performance
standards, termed Remedy Standard A or Remedy Standard B. Under Remedy
Standard A, affected media must be removed or decontaminated to
permanently reduce COC concentrations below critical PCLs. Under Remedy
Standard B, removal, decontamination, or control measures may be applied
to prevent exposure media exceeding critical PCLs. 2
12
The Texas Administrative Code states that PCLs must be established for
each COC in an environmental medium at a potential cleanup site unless a
number of criteria are met.213 None of the listed criteria applies to the
Kennedy Heights property, however, meaning that under the regulations
available in draft form in 1996, the lowest of three values-relating to three
different kinds of PCLs-for each chemical should have been selected and
compared with background levels to determine whether to proceed with a
207 Gerard E. Dallal, Nonparametric Statistics, http://www.tufts.edu/-gdaUal/npar.htm (last
visited Jan. 28, 2007).
208 COMPLIANCE SOLUTIONS, INC., supra note 147, at 6.
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 TOXICOLOGY AND RISK ASSESSMENT SECTION, TEx. NATURAL RES. CONSERVATION COMM'N,
GUIDANCE FOR CONDUCTING ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENTS AT REMEDIATION SITES IN TEXAS 4
(2001) (citations omitted).
213 30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 350.71(k) (2006).
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soil assessment.214 Present regulations deviate from the kind of site-
specific determination of background that Chevron conducted and instead
call for risk-based standards that are not based on the attainment of
background unless background is greater than the risk-based PCL or the
chemical is listed as a Texas-specific soil background concentration. 21 5 In
any event, CSI did not compare its statistically-generated background
levels to PCLs for each chemical, but rather to soil sample data offered by
the parties, primarily from Chevron.2
16
Following completion of the Baseline Risk Assessment, the only other
analytic application of the sampling data was carried out by EPA. Their
report noted that "there were Quality Assurance/Quality Control issues
with previously collected data and therefore the EPA would collect its own
data to be used in [its] investigation."2 17 This included mostly soil samples
(sixty-two), as well as a few soil gas (thirteen) and groundwater (nine)
samples, the latter utilizing Chevron's former monitoring wells.
218 All
samples were taken at zero to two and four to six feet below the surface.219
The inspection did not include drinking water samples because, as the
report noted, "[a] review of City and State records indicate[d] that the
drinking water supply in the Kennedy Heights neighborhood me[t] all
drinking water standards.""' Traces of volatile organic compounds were
found in soil samples, as were traces in groundwater samples. 221 In
addition, "a thin oily layer of non-aqueous phase liquid (NAPL) was
encountered while taking water level measurements at groundwater
monitoring well NE-30."22 2 EPA contractors documented hydrocarbon
odors at several sampling locations when opening soil core barrels.2
3
Visible hydrocarbons were present in a monitoring well and in one of the
soil samples.224 Still, EPA engaged in risk calculations only for soil as a
possible exposure pathway.
The fact that almost all the TPH occurs in soils at depths greater than 2 feet
[below ground] indicates that direct exposure to soil at depth, is not a
complete pathway and the risk is reduced. The EPA also assumed a "worst
case scenario" in which the highest concentration of TPH detected under
214 REMEDIATION Div., TEX. COMM'N ON ENVTL. QUALITY, REGULATORY GUIDANCE: AFFECTED
PROPERTY ASSESSMENT REQUIREMENTS 8 (2004).
215 30 TEx. ADMIN. CODE §§ 350.4(a)(6), 350.51(m) (2006).
216 COMPLIANCE SOLUTIONS, INC., supra note 147, at 5.
217 ECOLOGY & ENV'T INC., supra note 46, at 4-2.
218 Id. at 4-4.
219 Id.
220 Id at 2-3 ("However[,] the EPA has met with both City officials and the residents several
times, and the resident[s'] concerns about their drinking water supply remain unresolved.").
221 Id at 4-6 to 4-7.
222 Id. at 4-7 ("An attempt was made to capture enough of the NAPL to send for laboratory
analysis, but there was not a sufficient quantity available for sample collection. A decision was
made to go ahead and sample the well, which went dry during purge activities. The well was
allowed to recover and a sample was collected for analysis.").
223 Id at 5-1.
224 Id.
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Texas Methods 1005/1006 (1580mg.kg), was excavated and spread on the
ground surface. A child playing in the dirt and coming in direct contact with
the soil containing the TPH through the oral, dermal, and inhalation routes of
exposure would yield a hazard quotient less than one.
225
The EPA concluded that "the soils do not present a risk to the residents
from exposure to TPH by direct contact with soil."
226
V. DISCUSSION
The foregoing description of the Baseline Risk Assessment and Expanded
Site Inspection only begins to delve into the assumptions driving the analysis,
which effectively ended at the comparison of background to sample values.
Still, it provides substantial documentation of the decisions made by Chevron
and EPA contractors, relying to a considerable degree on best guesses and the
use of proxy data- The process was sufficiently removed from those affected
by its results that residents chose to seek relief in the courts. Residents' data
gathering and analysis, designed to directly test their narratives of
contamination, were challenged by Chevron attorneys under Daubert
principles. For example, doubt was cast on plaintiffs' computer model of how
toxicants moved from waterlines to residents' sinks and bathtubs. 227 Chevron
questioned many of the assumptions underlying the model itself and plaintiffs'
choice of model inputs, 2 2 claiming the model was not "scientifically valid."
229
225 Id at 5-1 to 5-2.
226 Id, at 5-2 (emphasis added).
227 For much of this work, plaintiffs retained Charles Howard & Associates. Howard was a
consultant to water, sewerage, and power utilities, as well as local, state, and federal
governments across North America, in the development and use of computer techniques for
water management. Letter from Charles D. Howard, Charles Howard & Assocs. Ltd., to Carl D.
Shaw, Associate, O'Quinn, Kerensky, McAninch & Laminack (Sept. 30, 1996) (on file with
author). After taking field measurements of water pressure at various points across the
distribution system in Kennedy Heights, Howard used EPANET, a computerized water
distribution system simulation developed by EPA, to model the fate and transport of
contaminants to plaintiffs' homes. Based on the introduction of 1 grain per square meter of a
contaminant to a hypothetical pipe break along the network, EPANET provided concentration
estimates at certain locations, in maximum levels within each hour in milligrams per liter
(mg/L) over a 24-hour period. Assuming contaminants entered the system during water main
repairs, Howard modeled concentrations at various points along water pipes and at certain
bellwether homes after a hypothetical repair at 11322 Murr Way or 11322 Lockgate Lane. His
findings suggested that between .027 and 5.082 mg/L of contaminant would travel in pipe 4243,
which delivered water to seven of the plaintiffs' homes, over the course of a 24-hour period
following introduction of the contaminant to a pipe at 11322 Murr Way. Id Plaintiffs also took
water samples and samples of "liquid crude oil floating on the water in the excavation directly
adjacent to the water main" after a pipe break at 11326 Lockgate Lane in September 1996. They
found PAH concentrations of 2.4 ppm in the water and 7,826 ppm in the oil. Plaintiffs' Summary
of the Case at 1, 7, Adams v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., No. 96-1462 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 10, 1997);
Transcript of Record Volume Im at 161, Adams v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., No. 96-1462 (S.D. Tex.
Sept. 10, 1997) (testimony of Dr. Patrick Agostino).
228 Summary of the Case Submitted by Defendants, Adams v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., No. 96-
1462 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 10, 1997).
229 Chevron claimed that plaintiffs' model: a) was not initially designed to model oil
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Defendants argued that much of the evidence regarding drinking water
contamination was inadmissible under the doctrine set forth in Dauberlt2 3
Before the federal district judge could rule on the admissibility of drinking
water and other evidence, the case settled out of court, in part because
plaintiffs wanted to avoid the possibility of a ruling on summary judgment.2 31
One response to the kinds of dynamics at work between RRC and
Chevron would be to ask whether more rigorous sampling and analysis
protocols could have been employed. Indeed, this is the argument, albeit in a
tangential venue, of those who would propose to apply the Daubert standard
of admissibility to the judicial review of agency decisions. Kenneth Davis and
Richard Pierce note in their administrative law treatise that "[t]o the extent
that the FRE announce any policy relevant to the rules of evidence [governing
administrative law] ... that policy is contained in Rule 703."232 The proposal to
apply Dauberts principles to agency-gathered scientific evidence views such a
process as a check on agency discretion that would ask "agencies to explicitly
indicate whether they have relied on science or policy to justify a decision.
Agency policy requires deference. Agency science can and should be
checked."233 One can envision, for example, judicial review of an agency-
commissioned risk assessment of Kennedy Heights, during which the known
or potential rates of error of the sampling methods (sampling technology,
sampling frame, location, timing, and other factors) and analysis tools (such as
the development of background figures and the use of statistical tests) are
used to determine the admissibility of risk assessment findings in support of
the agency's decision not to pursue site cleanup.
It is true that some of the methods used by RRC and Chevron may be less
accepted by the scientific community (e.g., random as opposed to grid
sampling, screen as opposed to in situ soil sampling) or even existing and
subsequent state regulations (e.g., comparing sampling results to statistically-
generated background figures as opposed to protective concentration levels)
than alternative approaches. But the post-Daubert climate suggests that
heightened scrutiny is not the answer. Indeed, it is unlikely that the techniques
employed at Kennedy Heights would ever meet the standards of relevance and
reliability developed in Daube4 Joiner, and other cases. Should RRC and EPA
have settled on the most universally accepted techniques for soil sampling and
data analysis, the Supreme Court's interpretation of scientific knowledge as
contamination but was created for modeling soluble substances such as chlorine, b) was not
calibrated in response to field measurements, c) eliminated portions of the water distribution
system to increase amounts of the contamination to certain homes, d) was run twice and then
totaled, and e) resulted in more PAHs at certain homes than had been entered under the
assumed water line break. Id.
230 id
231 MACEY & SUSSIUND, supra note 19.
232 2 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 10.2, at
120 (3d ed. 1994).
233 Andrew Trask, Daubert and the EPA: An Evidentiary Approach to Reviewing Agency
Deterninations of Risk, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 569, 587 (1997). But see McGarity, supra note 15,
at 155 (arguing for stringent review of scientific conclusions underlying risk assessments
undertaken by regulatory agencies through a Daubert-inspired "corpuscular" approach).
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"derived by the scientific method" and more recent courts' attempts to
determine "fit" between data in former studies with the cases in front of them
suggest that the effort would still fall short.
First, an agency investigating a site in which the contamination present
is unknown will not be able to say with complete certainty whether its
sampling methods can or cannot be proven wrong. Nor will it be able to
derive a rate of error. Throughout the process, resource, timing, and
knowledge constraints will force the monitoring agency to engage in
bricolage, making do with whatever equipment and expertise are available.
It is doubtful that the realities of agency oversight could, absent an infusion
of substantial appropriations and personnel, lead to the use of nothing other
than peer-reviewed and published methodologies.
But even more opposed to the Daubert standard is the practice of risk
assessment itself, where findings are extrapolated from what limited data
are known. Data inferences, such as those used in the Baseline Risk
Assessment or in the hazard and dose-response assessments that take place
long before an agency sets foot in a place like Kennedy Heights, cannot be
"derived;" rather, they involve a series of judgment calls. Should an agency's
more stringent approach to site and risk assessment withstand the scrutiny
of an administrative law judge, the application of the Daubert corpuscular
approach to dose-response studies linking PAHs to carcinogenicity, or
epidemiological studies of its possible links to lupus, would in all likelihood
end the inquiry. There are far too many links in the chain of causation from
hazard assessment (whether one or more substances can cause certain
disease outcomes) to dose-response assessment (what levels of a given
contaminant contribute to an unacceptable risk of those diseases) to
ecological assessment (finding the location and defining the fate and
transport of chemicals of concern) to risk assessment (quantifying risk and
comparing it with dose-response analyses to determine acceptable levels of
a contaminant in soil or water) for even the most diligent agency to shore up
its findings against the strict standards of validity that are commonly
employed today.
An alternative response to the Kennedy Heights story would be to argue
that, far from a search for the proper amalgam of methodologies, the
process should be made more transparent in order to encourage the use -of
an acceptable approach to site characterization. As the sense of disconnect
between resident narratives and RRC-Chevron site assessments illustrates,
citizen and professional modes of producing knowledge differ immensely.
Differences have been found between residents and "experts" in their
definitions of data quality, methods of analysis, and accepted levels of
measurement and statistical significance.2 34 The contrast can be appreciated
through a comparison of popular and scientific epidemiology.23 Scientific
234 See generally Phil Brown, Popular Epidemiology and Toxic Waste Contamination: Lay
and Professional Ways of Knowing, 33 J. OF HEALTH & Soc. BEHAV. 267, 268 (1992) (discussing
the different perspectives community members and scientists have in investigating and
interpreting environmental health data).
235 See L. David Brown & Rajesh Tandon, Ideology and Political Economy in Inquiry: Action
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epidemiology makes use of a variety of study designs (e.g., case control,
prospective and retrospective cohort) to investigate the statistical relation
between exposure to various elements and disease.236 In contrast, citizens
concerned about a possible source of disease engage in the following steps:
a) groups of people in a contaminated neighborhood separately notice
health effects and pollutants, b) they hypothesize a connection between the
two, and c) a more cohesive group of residents learn about the particulars of
the two, through symptom surveys, greater interaction among residents,
gathering sources of information, and talking to officials.237
Failed attempts by residents of communities such as Kennedy Heights,
Woburn, Massachusetts, and Love Canal to obtain answers to their "non-
scientific" hunches result in distrust of agency officials. Participatory
research offers an alternative to research of root causes of health concerns,
which proceeds with an air of indeterminacy of means and ends.2"8 The
parties involved agree that achieving complete objectivity is impossible in
these latter situations, and seek to uphold the value of useful knowledge
regardless of whether it conforms to scientific notions of significance or
proper units of analysis.2 3 While it may seem difficult to dispute the validity
of a technically-derived substantive claim with resident stories or contextual
data, "truth" in participatory research is left indeterminate-only through
planning, acting on plans, and observing and reflecting on results is truth
confirmed. A popular example of the use of participatory research for site
assessment is the local identification and prioritization of key issues through
risk mapping.2"' Advances in geographic information systems technology
allow residents to work with regulators to represent sources of
environmental harm. Joint fact-finding efforts, used to assist in the
mediation of public disputes, can govern the proper use of this and other
methods, through group efforts to determine issues of concern, processes
for gathering information, what questions should be asked, methods of
analysis and their underlying assumptions, limitations to these methods, and
how to proceed once new information is known. 24
1
Research and Participatory Research, 19 J. OF APPLIED BEHAV. Sci. 277, 291-92 (1983)
(comparing action research and participatory research approaches).
236 See CHARLEs H. HENNEKENS & JULIE E. BURING, EPIDEMIOLOGY IN MEDICINE 16-28 (Sherry
L. Mayrent ed., 1987) (explaining design strategies used in epidemiologic research).
237 Brown, supra note 234, at 269.
238 Bunyan Bryant, Pollution Prevention and Participatory Research As a Methodology for
Environmental Justice, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 589, 599 (1995).
239 See Brown, supra note 234, at 278 (noting that some communities may have exaggerated
fears about the risks of hazards or the health effects of substances but such information can
still be useful to public health officials).
240 Kevin Smith, Christopher B. Barrett & Paul W. Box, Participatory Risk Mapping for
Targeting Research and Assistance: With an Example from East African Pastoralists, 28 WORLD
DEV. 1945, 1947 (2000).
241 John R. Ehrmann & Barbara L. Stinson, Joint Fact-Finding and the Use of Technical
Experts, in THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK 375, 377 (Lawrence Susskind et al. eds., 1999);
see Heli Saarikoski, Environmental Impact Assessment As Collaborative Learning Process, 20
ENVTL. IMPACT ASSESSMENT REV. 681, 691 (2000) (noting that joint fact finding in the
environmental impact assessment process led to a shared understanding of potential impacts to
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Kennedy Heights presents a clear example of agency inability to gather
data absent flaws, leaps of logic, and unproven inferences. Other examples
exist, such as during facility siting processes governed by the National
Environmental Policy Act,242 where agencies were unable to gather quality
environmental baseline data, limiting the validity of objective comparisons
between project alternatives. Residents' daily interactions with a given
locale give them a degree of familiarity with environmental conditions
unavailable to federal agencies, such as when the Yavapai defeated
construction of a dam at the intersection of the Salt and Verde rivers in
Arizona 243 or the Northern Cheyenne resisted the "value neutrality" of the
Bureau of Land Management's assessment of increased coal sales in
Montana.21 Stories of residents countering existing "scientific" findings are
few, however, because of the lack of standing granted citizen groups before
the "knowledge" presented in an Environmental Impact Statement or risk
assessment is constituted by technical personnel. But would efforts at
reforming site assessments, altering the sequencing of knowledge
production or offering joint fact-finding or other partnerships in monitoring
environmental impacts be feasible in a post-Daubert environment?
A starting point, surprisingly enough, would be to reconsider Daubert
itself. In addition to eschewing the Frye general acceptance test, the Court
addressed the difference between legal and scientific inquiry:
Petitioners and, to a greater extent, their amidci exhibit a different concern.
They suggest that recognition of a screening role for the judge that allows for
the exclusion of "invalid" evidence will sanction a stifling and repressive
scientific .orthodoxy and will be inimical to the search for truth. See, e.g., Brief
for Ronald Bayer et al. as Anmci Curilae. It is true that open debate is an
essential part of both legal and scientific analyses. Yet there are important
differences between the quest for truth in the courtroom and the quest for truth
in the laboratory. Scientific conclusions are subject to perpetual revision. Law,
on the other hand, must resolve disputes finally and quickly. The scientific
project is advanced by broad and wide-ranging consideration of a multitude of
hypotheses, for those that are incorrect will eventually be shown to be so, and
that in itself is an advance. Conjectures that are probably wrong are of little
use, however, in the project of reaching a quick, final, and binding legal
judgment-often of great consequence-about a particular set of events in the
past.2
45
The search for an interpretation of Daubertthat lies somewhere between the
strict standards used by many district judges and the more flexible approach
waste management alternatives).
242 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370e (2000).
243 Wendy Espeland, Legally Mediated Identioy The National Environmental Policy Act and
the Bureaucratic Construction of Interests, 28 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 1149, 1150-51, 1169 (1994).
244 See James P. Boggs, The Use of Anthropological Knowledge Under NEPA, 49 Hum. ORG.
217, 221 (1990) (discussing the Northern Cheyenne's move to sue the U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation because the social impact analysis in the environmental impact statement for
additional coal sales in Montana ignored the Tribe).
245 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596-97 (1993).
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hinted at in the above dicta continues. Some courts of appeals have erred on
the side of a more liberal approach, finding that their task is not to establish
a per se exclusion of a method not generally accepted or noting that they
should consider a variety of factors when ruling on questions of reliability.246
The debate over Dauber4 its consequences for toxic tort claims, and the
appropriate standard of admissibility for site and risk assessment data
would be aided by considering the limits to scientific knowledge generally,
agency means of carrying out "scientific" methods and processes, and their
application to communities such as Kennedy Heights specifically. We should
accept the nature of inquiries such as site and risk assessment as negotiated,
ad hoc processes, requiring more participatory involvement of interested
parties to assure their legitimacy. Then we can begin to consider a mid-range
view of scientific evidence, located between scientific orthodoxy and overly-
permissive admissibility, which will provide a space for agencies, residents,
and potentially responsible parties to recognize their limitations and seek
more common ground.
246 See, e.g., United States v. Posado, 57 F.3d 428, 434, 436 (5th Cir. 1995) (removing the per
se rule against admissibility of polygraph examinations and remanding to the district court to
apply the principles in the Federal Rules of Evidence and Daubert); In re Paoli Railroad Yard
PCB Litigation, 35 F.3d 717, 742 (3d Cir. 1994) (asserting that the district court should employ
the factors in Daubert and any other relevant factors to determine the reliability of scientific
evidence).
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